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INTRODUCTION
The death penalty is a highly controversial form of punishment
both in the United States and abroad.' The United States is not in
good company with its record for executions.2 However, the death
penalty continues to exist as a form of criminal punishment and
courts continue to impose it despite international movements to
abolish it altogether.' Given general international disfavor for the
death penalty, it is disturbing to note that more than 120 foreign
nationals are on death row in the United States,4 and more than half
of them are Mexican nationals.'
1. See Kathryn F. King, The Death Penalty, Extradition, and the War Against
Terrorism: U.S. Responses to European Opinion About Capital Punishment, 9
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 161, 164 (2003) (finding that international human rights
norms discourage the use of the death penalty and that the United States usually
includes controversial restrictions in international human rights agreements before
ratifying them).
2. See Richard J. Wilson, International Law Issues in Death Penalty Defense,
31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1195, 1210 (2003) (stating that the United States, China and
Iran carried out eighty-one percent of executions worldwide in 2002).
3. See id. (noting that the trend in international law is toward abolition of the
death penalty). In fact, recently created U.N. international criminal tribunals forbid
capital punishment as a penalty for crimes including genocide, war crimes, and
human rights violations. Id.
4. See Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights to Consular
Notification and Access in the United States: What's Changed Since the LaGrand
Case?, 25 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 1, 94 (2002) (speculating that Mexico is likely to
continue to protest against the use of the death penalty because of the number of
nationals it has on death row in the United States).
5. See id. (postulating that Mexico's protests against the death penalty will
remind the United States of its international legal obligations and that this may
2005]
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
International law. requires that the United States comply with its
duties under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and with
the decisions issued by the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
regarding this treaty.6 While the United States appears to be
cognizant of these obligations, it continues to violate the Vienna
Convention.7 Most recently, in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States),8 the ICJ found that the United States
violated its duty to provide for consular access in the cases of fifty-
two Mexican defendants on death row in multiple U.S. states. 9 This
casenote argues that the ICJ correctly found the United States in
violation of the Vienna Convention and that the United States must
comply with the Avena decision through either judicial or non-
judicial means.10
Part I of this casenote examines the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and the prior decisions of Case Concerning the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States)" and LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States)12 in order to
lead to other cases in the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") for U.S. violations
of international law).
6. See discussion infra Part I.A.2 (observing the binding nature of the Vienna
Convention and ICJ decisions interpreting the Convention).
7. See discussion infra Part I.B (noting the decisions issued from the ICJ in
which it found that the United States violated Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention); see also Kelly Trainer, The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations in the United States Courts, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW 227, 230 (2000)
(stating that the United States vigorously demands adherence to the Vienna
Convention when it comes to U.S. citizens but has a "less than perfect record"
when it comes to foreign nationals detained in the United States).
8. 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31).
9. See id. 115 (holding that the United States in fact violated Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention in the fifty-two cases Mexico presented to the Court); see
also Dinah L. Shelton, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States) 43 ILM 581 (2004) International Court of Justice March
31, 2004, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 559, 559 (2004) (stating that the ICJ decision was 14-
1 and giving a summary of the decision and the parties' main arguments).
10. See discussion infra Parts II-I1 (discussing the ICJ's holdings in the Avena
decision and giving suggestions of how the United States may successfully
implement this ruling domestically).
11. 1998 ICJ 99 (Nov. 10).
12. 2001 ICJ 104 (June 27).
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set the scene for the case most recently decided by the ICJ, Avena. 13
Part I then discusses the details of Avena, finding that the ICJ has, at
long last, had an opportunity to rule on an allegation of a U.S.
violation of the Vienna Convention, where the ruling is such that the
United States can pragmatically incorporate it into U.S. domestic
law. 14
Part II analyzes the ICJ's rulings on particular issues in the Avena
decision." This casenote argues that the ICJ correctly denied
restitutio in integrum and rightfully ordered the United States to
provide meaningful review and reconsideration under the LaGrand
rule. 16 The ICJ has provided a more precise definition of meaningful
review and reconsideration in Avena, 7 but erred in failing to issue an
order of cessation and guarantee of non-repetition.18
Part III recommends that the United States implement the Avena
decision as controlling authority.19 The United States may implement
the Avena ruling judicially by taking into account the violations of
Vienna Convention rights."0 Alternatively, the American Bar
13. See discussion infra Parts I.A-B (establishing the binding nature of the
Vienna Convention and describing the Breard and LaGrand cases as precedent to
the Avena case).
14. See discussion infra Part I.B.3 (noting that Avena presents the first
opportunity for an ICJ ruling to impact the lives of the defendants in the case of an
allegation of a Vienna Convention violation).
15. See discussion infra Part II.A (providing Mexican and U.S. arguments on
each issue as well as the relevant intemational law to determine the outcome of
each allegation).
16. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.a (arguing that restitutio in integrum is not
an appropriate remedy under international law).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.c (arguing that the Avena remedy is
appropriate given the nature of the violation at issue).
18. See discussion infra Part II.A.4 (finding that an order of cessation and a
guarantee of non-repetition is appropriate under international law standards).
19. See discussion infra Part III (recommending that the United States should
treat the Avena ruling as binding precedent and implement it in whatever method it
deems necessary since no international body has authority to force a specific
implementation plan).
20. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (recommending vacatur of the death
sentences as a means of judicial implementation of the Avena remedy in the case of
an Article 36 violation).
2005] 407
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Association ("ABA") Guidelines provide an innovative solution for
implementing Article 36 rights outside of the courtroom setting.2"
This casenote concludes by suggesting that the United States
reconsider its role in the international world, should it wish to
provide the benefits of the Vienna Convention to Americans who
travel and live abroad.22 The United States should begin this
reconsideration through acknowledging the Avena decision and
domestically implementing the ICJ ruling. 3
I. BACKGROUND
A. TERMS OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, created in 1963, is
a multilateral treaty that outlines consular relations and functions.24
The United States officially ratified the Vienna Convention in
1969.25 Article 36 of the treaty secures contact between a foreign
21. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (considering the ABA Guidelines as one
option to implement the ICJ ruling in a meaningful way since it would lead to the
application of international law at the domestic court level in the United States).
22. See discussion infra Parts II and III (suggesting that the United States must
participate more actively in international law).
23. See discussion infra Part III (describing ways in which the United States
may effectively implement the Avena decision).
24. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 1012 (rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter
ABA GUIDELINES] (finding substantial evidence showing that American authorities
are apt to fail to comply with the obligations under the Vienna Convention and
explaining that failure to comply has both practical and legal consequences),
available at http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/guidelines.pdf (last visited Jan.
29, 2005). The United States has become notorious for its failure to enforce the
rights enumerated in the Vienna Convention and, even worse, for its blatant
violation of them. Id.
25. See Note, Too Sovereign But Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States
Beyond the Reach of the Law of Nations?, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2654, 2656 (2003)[hereinafter Too Sovereign] (noting that the United States was one of the original
signatories in 1963 and that the Nixon administration completed the ratification
process in 1969).
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national and his consular post when he is in a "receiving State. ' 6
While Article 36(1)(a) establishes freedom of communication
between non-detained foreign nationals and consular officials,27
Article 36(1)(b) outlines the rights available to detained individuals
while abroad.28 Upon the foreign national's request, the appropriate
authorities of the receiving State must inform the corresponding
consulate of the detention.2 9 Article 36(1)(b) emphasizes the
importance of the detained person gaining knowledge of his rights
"without delay" and of the consulate receiving notice of the detention
"without delay. '30
26. See Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 36 (noting that contact with the
receiving state includes prompt notification when a national of the sending state is
arrested, incarcerated, remanded into custody, or any other type of detainment); see
also United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 620 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000) (explaining that under the provisions of the
Vienna Convention the "receiving State" is the nation in which the person is
detained, assuming that it is not his nation of citizenship and the "sending State" is
the nation where the person maintains citizenship status).
27. See Roberto Iraola, Federal Criminal Prosecutions and the Right to
Consular Notification Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 105 W. VA. L.
REv. 179, 184 (2002) (acknowledging that to exercise consular functions
effectively, consulates must be able to speak to their nationals).
28. See Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 36(l)(b) (stating that upon the
individual's request, "the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner"); see also Trainer, supra note 7,
at 229 (describing the difficulties a foreign national has when arrested abroad that
compel consular assistance and reiterating that consular relations are essential in
the development of friendly relations among nations and for ensuring protection
for aliens residing in other states).
29. See Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 36(l)(b) (requiring the
proficient authorities to contact the consular post corresponding to the nationality
of the detained individual).
30. Id. In its application before the ICJ in the spring of 2003, Mexico
contended that "without delay" meant almost immediately. See Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ 128, Application Instituting
Proceedings of January 9, 68 [hereinafter Avena Application] (arguing that even
when the United States did attempt to comply with Article 36, it did not do so
without delay), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
imus/imusorder/imusjiapplication_-2003010 9 .PDF (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). The
U.S. State Department, however, has interpreted "without delay" to mean that no
deliberate delay should occur and that notification should "certainly" be within
seventy-two hours of arrest or detention. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
4092005]
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Article 36(l)(c) of the Vienna Convention specifically mentions
that consular officers have the right to communicate with a detained
national of the sending State and "to arrange for his legal
representation."'3' To enforce these international obligations on the
national level, Article 36(2) provides that the enumerated rights
"shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State. 32 However, those laws and regulations "must enable
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under [Article 36(1)] are intended. 33
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND OTHER LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
OTHER OFFICIALS REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE RIGHTS OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS To ASSIST THEM (1998) [hereinafter STATE
DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS] (requiring notification to occur "as soon as
reasonably possible under the circumstances"), available at
http://www.travel.state.gov/law/notify.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
31. See Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 36(l)(c) (bestowing upon
consular officers the right to visit the detained national but requiring the officers to
refrain from action if the individual does not request assistance). However, the
right to have legal representation arranged is distinct from actually obtaining legal
counsel and advice. See Iraola, supra note 27, at 208-209 (noting that invoking the
Constitutional right to counsel achieves a different legal result than invoking the
right to speak to a consulate because the rights are distinct under domestic and
international law).
32. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 36(2). See Lori Fisler Damrosch,
Interpreting U.S. Treaties in Light of Human Rights Values, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 43, 53-54 (2002-2003) (discussing the Supreme Court's position that the
treaty itself places domestic law above treaty law by requiring the treaty rights to
conform to State laws and regulations). Some scholars argue that the Vienna
Convention could never circumvent domestic criminal codes because it is
constructed to conform with, and not to interfere with, local laws. Id.
33. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 36(2). See Memorial of the
Republic of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 ICJ 99 Written Pleadings §§ 2.1-2.2
(Oct. 9) [hereinafter Memorial of Paraguay] (taking as fact the U.S. failure to
inform Breard of his right to consular notification), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005); see also
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ 104, 15 (June 27) (stating that
it was an undisputed fact that the U.S. authorities did not inform Karl and Walter
LaGrand of their right to speak to the German consulate). This provision requiring
enforcement of consular rights is the sticking point that previous cases have
introduced and that is at issue again in Avena. Id. See also Avena Application,
supra note 30, 68 (arguing that U.S. officials in various states failed to inform the
detained Mexicans of their right to speak to the Mexican consulate).
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1. The Importance of the Vienna Convention and the Rights it
Provides
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants foreign nationals the
right to have access to a consulate-a right that is important for a
myriad of reasons. 34 Consular assistance gives the foreign national a
better understanding of the legal system of the receiving state and
provides better access to a psychological and emotional support
system.35 In addition to acting as cultural liaisons, consular officials
can also assist detained foreign nationals by providing bilingual
attorneys or by collecting mitigating evidence. 36 Most importantly, if
34. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 24 (commenting that consulates have
legal representation duties, which include establishing diplomatic assistance,
obtaining evidence for the investigation, providing cultural references in order to
understand the American legal system, and contacting family and friends). The
average citizen who wishes to go abroad for an extensive period of time can clearly
understand the importance of the right to consular access under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention. Id.; see also Erik J. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond
Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 147, 184 (1999) (enumerating examples of
American citizens who needed consular assistance-particularly when detained or
victimized by crime-while volunteering, working, or studying abroad). Yet for
the foreign national who is detained while abroad, then charged with a crime, tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death, the importance of this right becomes
immeasurable. Id.; see also Advisory Opinion 16, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 99, OC/ser. A
(1999) (recognizing the international principle that nations that impose the death
penalty have a more "rigorous" duty to abide by judicial decrees in cases dealing
with an individual's right to consular notification), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/A/OC-16ingles-sinfirmas.html (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005). One of the greatest benefits of the right of consular notification is
that it applies reciprocally: Americans abroad have the right to speak to the U.S.
consulate just as foreign nationals in the United States have the fight to speak to
their respective consulates. Id. See also United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ 64, at 6 (May 24) (noting that the United
States asserted that Iran violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and that the
government of Tehran was obligated to secure the release of all the U.S. citizens
being held hostage); Iraola, supra note 27, at 180 (finding that when American
citizens have been detained abroad, the United States has strongly promoted the
use and enforcement of Article 36 rights).
35. See Amanda E. Burks, Consular Assistance for Foreign Defendants:
Avoiding Default and Fortifying a Defense, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 29, 53 (2001)
(asserting that consulates provide a source of comfort and a "familiar face" to
foreign national defendants who experience unease or need additional attention and
resources).
36. See Adam Liptak, Mexico Awaits Hague Ruling on Citizens on U.S. Death
Row, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004 at Al (noting that Mexican officials say that
2005]
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foreign countries allow consular officials to perform their duties
effectively, the foreign government is more likely to sentence the
foreign national to life in prison, as opposed to the death penalty.37
Consular officials can secure legal representation, obtain mitigating
evidence from the defendant's country of origin, and provide access
to cultural references, all of which arguably contribute to a better
legal defense.38
2. The Binding Nature of the Vienna Convention and JCJ Decisions
In the hierarchy of U.S. law, an international treaty receives the
same consideration as a federal statute and when there is a conflict
between the two, the "later-in-time" rule applies.39 The event that
came later in time, either the statute or the treaty, will prevail as the
legally binding authority.4' When dealing with treaties, U.S.
domestic law invokes the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which
obliges State parties to a treaty to perform the treaty in good faith.42
All treaties and federal statutes remain a step subordinate to the
Mexican defendants in the U.S. criminal justice system are often "confused,
distrustful, unable to speak English and baffled by American procedures"),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/O/l 16/national/16DEAT.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2005). This phenomenon can cause detrimental outcomes that
consular officials can help prevent. Id.
37. See id. (referring to Mexican foreign affairs ministry official Victor Manuel
Uribe Avina's statement that when "consular protection is permitted to function"
cases often result in less serious sentences).
38. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 24 (observing the advantages that
consular officials provide foreign defendants detained in the United States).
39. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (discussing the status of Acts of
Congress and treaties and the "later-in-time" rule, which requires that when a
statute and treaty are inconsistent, the one that was enacted later in time will
triumph, given that Acts of Congress and treaties otherwise receive equal
treatment).
41. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 (defining further the "later-in-time" rule as giving
precedence to the document that was most recently created by emphasizing that
both treaties and statutes must be in compliance with the Constitution).
42. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (requiring parties who are bound to a treaty to perform it in
"good faith").
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Constitution because the U.S. Constitution occupies the top tier of
the legal hierarchy. 43 Treaties and federal statutes do trump state law,
however, which falls at the bottom of the hierarchical system.44
When the United States ratified the Optional Protocol Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, it automatically consented to
the jurisdiction of the ICJ for "disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the Convention. '45 The United States
is thus consensually bound to the rulings of the ICJ for disputes
concerning the Convention.46 Moreover, the Supremacy Clause in the
U.S. Constitution renders the Vienna Convention binding upon
states, 47 and, as a self-executing treaty, the Vienna Convention
43. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6 (finding that the Constitution is superior to a
treaty in the hierarchy of law because "[t]he United States is entirely a creature of
the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution."). The
Constitution and constitutional rights define much of U.S. law, a choice the United
States made when it created the Constitution. Id. See also JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 23 (2nd ed. 1985) (noting that in civil
law, as opposed to common law, the legal hierarchy- in order of importance -
includes statutes, administrative regulations, and custom).
44. See U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-231 (1942) (concluding that formal
treaties will govern when there is inconsistent state law); see also Too Sovereign,
supra note 25, at 2658 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's expansive
interpretation of the treaty power in US. v. Pink).
45. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
169, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488 [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (providing for states
parties to concede compulsory jurisdiction to the ICJ in disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the Convention, unless they agree on another form
of settlement within a reasonable period of time); see also Too Sovereign, supra
note 25, at 2656-57 (finding that because the United States rejected the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ over treaty and international law matters in 1986, the
Optional Protocol is important because the ICJ now only has jurisdiction over the
United States in cases where a treaty specifically provides for the ICJ's
jurisdiction, which the Vienna Convention accomplishes through the Optional
Protocol). Therefore, although the United States has rejected the jurisdiction of the
ICJ generally, the ICJ retains jurisdiction over the United States for Vienna
Convention disputes. Id.
46. See Optional Protocol, supra note 45 (providing for compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ over the United States in disputes arising out of the
interpretation of the Vienna Convention).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (affirming that "This Constitution... and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
2005]
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necessitates no further legislative implementation to enable its
operation.48
B. ICJ RULINGS REGARDING THE VIENNA CONVENTION
1. The Breard Case (Paraguay v. United States)
The case of Angel Francisco Breard, a citizen of Paraguay whom
the Commonwealth of Virginia charged with attempted rape and
capital murder, brought to light U.S. violations of the Vienna
Convention.4 9 Throughout Breard's entire adjudication process,
including the appeals in state courts, no one ever informed him of his
right to speak to a consulate. 0 After Paraguayan officials learned of
Breard's detention, conviction, and sentence, both Breard and
Paraguay pursued multiple avenues in search of relief, none of which
had a positive result.51
shall be supreme Law of the Land"); see also Too Sovereign, supra note 25, at
2657-58 (finding that while domestic criminal law normally falls under the domain
of state law in the U.S. federal system, formal treaties preempt state law). Treaties
are incorporated into U.S. domestic law through the Supremacy Clause. Id.
However, some scholars argue that U.S. courts have not always interpreted the
Supremacy Clause accurately. Id. See also, e.g., Cara Drinan, Note, Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Private Enforcement in American
Courts after LaGrand, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1303, 1307 (2002) (arguing that U.S.
courts have failed to apply LaGrand correctly through the Supremacy Clause).
48. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 10-11 (noting that the Vienna Convention is
self-executing). But see Howard S. Schiffinan, Breard and Beyond: The Status of
Consular Notification and Access Under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 40-42 (2000) (noting that while various U.S. courts have
construed the Vienna Convention to be both non-self-executing and self-executing,
the more immediate interest of the courts is whether the defendant was "actually
prejudiced" by a Convention violation).
49. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998) (discussing the State's
presentation of "overwhelming evidence" of Breard's guilt).
50. See Memorial of Paraguay, supra note 33, at 2.13-2.15 (discussing Breard's
petition for habeas corpus and other appeals that the state courts denied).
51. See id. at 2.16-2.17 (noting that when Paraguayan officials learned of
Breard's situation, they filed a habeas corpus motion in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia). Paraguay argued that the United States
violated Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention by allowing the doctrine of
procedural default to preclude Breard from bringing his claim in federal court. Id.
at 4.34-4.35. The federal courts dismissed Paraguay's separate suit seeking vacatur
of Breard's conviction and sentence. Id. The Virginia state courts and the federal
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While the Commonwealth of Virginia proceeded to set a date of
execution for Breard, Paraguay filed, inter alia, a request with the ICJ
for provisional measures of protection so that Breard would not be
executed. 2 The ICJ issued an Order of Provisional Measures
("Order") on April 9, 1998, five days before Breard's scheduled
execution, stating that "[t]he United States should take all measures
at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings."53 Despite the Order,
the Commonwealth of Virginia executed Breard as scheduled. 4
In Breard, the Supreme Court was not ruling on the merits of an
allegation of a Vienna Convention violation." Rather, the Court
courts concluded that it was too late for Breard to raise a Vienna Convention
violation claim. Id. at 2.21. See also Breard, 523 U.S. at 373 (detailing Breard's
argument that his denial of the right to consular access was cause for overturning
his state court conviction and sentence). The district court denied the motion on
procedural default grounds: Breard had to raise the claim in state court or he could
never raise it again. Id. See also Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263
(E.D. Va. 1996) (finding that Breard's claim was procedurally defaulted and that,
in any event, he could not show cause or prejudice because these grounds cannot
be shown through a contention of inadequate counsel; counsel's failure to raise the
claim is a risk that the petitioner must bear); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F.
Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding
that, inter alia, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim
because there was no applicable exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity).
52. See Memorial of Paraguay, supra note 33, at 2.22-2.30 (noting the various
applications Paraguay and Breard submitted to the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in addition to the diplomatic negotiations initiated in hopes of
staying Breard's execution, even while Virginia had already set the date of
execution); see also Bishop, supra note 4, at 18 (discussing the procedural history
of the Breard decision).
53. See Memorial of Paraguay, supra note 33, at 5.1 (ordering that the U.S.
should not execute Breard, pending the final decision in the proceedings).
54. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 23 (stating that Virginia officials executed
Breard by lethal injection on April 14, 1998, the date of his scheduled execution);
see also Christopher E. van der Waerden, Note, Death and Diplomacy: Paraguay
v. United States and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 45 WAYNE L.
REV. 1631, 1640 (1999) (distinguishing between the contradictory arguments that
the Clinton administration issued at the time of Breard's execution). The
Department of Justice argued that the Supreme Court should allow the execution to
go forward, while the Department of State urged the Virginia governor to stay the
execution pending the ruling of the ICJ. Id.
55. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 378-79 (denying Breard's "petition for an original
writ of habeas corpus, the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, the petitions
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denied Breard's petition for habeas corpus because he had
procedurally defaulted the claim5 6 and the Court denied Paraguay's
submissions on the grounds that there was not an applicable
exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereignty that would allow for
a suit against a state. 7 The Court's denial of Breard's habeas corpus
petition did not reach the issue of whether U.S. authorities had in fact
violated his right to consular notification under the Vienna
Convention. 8
The United States blatantly disregarded international law by
executing Breard despite the ICJ's Order-an action that provides
the resonating complexity in Breard's case.59 The U.S. Supreme
Court found that the Order deserved "respectful consideration" but
was not legally binding.6 ° U.S. Government officials recommended
to the Supreme Court that the ICJ decision should not necessarily be
considered binding.6' Additionally, the Supreme Court, in dicta, left
for certiorari, and the accompanying stay applications filed by Breard and
Paraguay").
56. See van der Waerden, supra note 54, at 1642 (stating that the Supreme
Court denied Breard's petition for two reasons: (1) the Vienna Convention must be
enacted in conformity with U.S. law, which meant that the procedural default rule
precluded the petition, and (2) the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 trumped the Vienna Convention based on the "later-in-time" rule, so that
Breard again raised his claim too late).
57. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 377-78 (finding that Paraguay's petition for
certiorari and the application for a stay of Breard's execution were not cognizable
in the U.S. Supreme Court because the Vienna Convention did not expressly
provide for a private right of action, there was no Eleventh Amendment exception
to state immunity from suit, and Paraguay was not authorized to bring suit under
§1983).
58. See Charles B. Radlauer, M.D., Note, A Clash of Power and Jurisdiction:
The United States Supreme Court v. the International Court of Justice, 11 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 489, 501 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court rejected Breard's
Vienna Convention claims on procedural and technical grounds).
59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (observing the U.S. disregard
for international law as evidenced by the Breard decision).
60. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (finding that the ICJ's Order did not trump the
presumption that "procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation
of the treaty in that State"). See generally Mark Weisburd, International Courts
and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 933 (2000) (questioning the
assumption that international law should trump domestic law and analyzing that
assumption as incorrect).
61. See Memorial of Paraguay, supra note 33, at 5.5 (noting that the Solicitor
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open the question of whether the Vienna Convention "confers on an
individual the right to consular assistance following arrest. '62 The
ICJ responded to these two issues-whether ICJ provisional
measures are binding and whether the Vienna Convention creates
individual rights-in the LaGrand decision just three years later.63
2. The LaGrand Decision
(Federal Republic of Germany v. United States)
Following the Breard case, the ICJ considered the uncannily
similar story of two German brothers executed by the state of
Arizona despite numerous pleas for reprieve in which they argued
that U.S. officials had violated their right to consular access.64 The
Arizona legal system convicted and sentenced Walter and Karl
LaGrand to death without their counsel ever raising the issue of non-
compliance with the Vienna Convention.65
General of the United States advised the Supreme Court that the ICJ Order did not
include "legal compulsion" and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright considered
the Order "non-binding"); see also van der Waerden, supra note 54, at 1640
(remarking that the Department of Justice did not consider the ICJ order to be
binding).
62. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (suggesting that certain provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 may not make consular
assistance an absolute right); see also, e.g., Henry J. Richardson III, The Execution
of Angel Breard by the United States: Violating an Order of the International
Court of Justice, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 121, 127 (1998) (positing that the
United States went so far as to violate Breard's human right to a fair trial). Some
scholars have argued that the Vienna Convention arguably creates a human right
and not only an individual right. Id.
63. See discussion infra Part I.B.2 (explaining the facts, holdings and
repercussions of the LaGrand decision).
64. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ 104, 10 (June 27)
(citing Germany's argument that the United States violated international legal
obligations under Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention by executing the
LaGrand brothers).
65. See id. 14 (stating that Arizona officials arrested the LaGrand brothers for
suspected involvement in an attempted murder and bank robbery, for which the
brothers were then tried, convicted, and sentenced to death). The United States
admitted that the appropriate authorities had not informed the brothers of their
right to speak to a German consulate throughout the trial, conviction, and
sentencing process. Id. 15. The brothers raised the issue of the U.S. failure to
inform them and the consulate of each entity's rights in their writ of habeas corpus.
Id. 23. The district court denied the writ on the basis of the procedural default
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Even after U.S. authorities informed the LaGrands of their right to
consular access and Germany made diplomatic attempts to stay the
execution of the brothers, Arizona authorities executed Karl
LaGrand.66 Shockingly, Arizona officials executed Walter LaGrand
on the same day that the ICJ issued an Order that the United States
"should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter
LaGrand is not executed."67 In an indication of the U.S. perception of
the LaGrand Order, and more generally of its attitude toward
international law, the United States issued a statement that the ICJ
Order indicating provisional measures "is not binding and does not
furnish a basis for judicial relief. 68
Although Arizona had already executed both of the LaGrand
defendants, the ICJ issued a decision on the merits of the case.69
Responding to the unresolved issue in Breard of whether the Vienna
rule. Id.
66. See Daniel A. McFaul, Jr., Germany v. United States of America 2001 ICJ
104, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 119, 121 (2002) (noting the diplomatic exchange
between Germany and the United States before Karl's execution on February 24,
1999, including the Governor of Arizona's rejection of an appeal for clemency by
Karl).
67. See LaGrand (F:R.G. v. U.S.) 1999 ICJ 104, Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures Order of Mar. 2, 1999 (stating that the Order staying
Walter's execution was issued on March 3, 1999, and that later the same day, the
state of Arizona executed him), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005); see also
Jennifer Lynne Weinman, The Clash Between U.S. Criminal Procedure and the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: An Analysis of the International Court
of Justice Decision in the LaGrand Case, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 857, 871 (2002)
(noting U.S. authorities apparently made no attempt to comply with the Order).
Weinman further observed that both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Department
of Justice failed to guarantee that Arizona officials not execute Walter LaGrand.
Id.
68. LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 33. The perception of LaGrand in U.S. law has
been a disappointment for the school of thought that adheres to the binding nature
of the ICJ decisions for Vienna Convention decisions. See Joan Fitzpatrick, The
Unreality of International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case, 27
YALE J. INT'L L. 427, 427-28 (2002) (arguing that interpretation of the LaGrand
decision has not reflected the importance of international law as legal authority).
69. See LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 128 (listing the ICJ's holding for each
matter brought before it). The ICJ found that the United States violated Article 36
of the Vienna Convention by failing to inform the LaGrands of their right to
consular notification and by failing to inform the German consulate of the
detention of its nationals. Id.
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Convention creates individual rights, the ICJ examined provisions
1 (b) and 1(c) of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and determined
that the Convention "creates individual rights, which . . . may be
invoked in the [ICJ] by the national State of the detained person."70
The ICJ also responded to the question left open in Breard of
whether provisional measures are binding71 by finding that the
United States violated the Order staying the execution of Walter
LaGrand.72
Thus, the ICJ highlighted three major legal obligations that,
although exigent at the time of the Breard case, were beyond
question in LaGrand: (1) the duty to comply with the individual
rights enumerated in Article 36; (2) the duty to carry out those rights
in a meaningful way; and (3) the duty to abide by the binding
decisions and provisional measures of the ICJ.73 When an individual
is detained for a prolonged period of time, convicted, or sentenced
despite a violation of these obligations, the ICJ found that the United
States should allow the "review and reconsideration of the conviction
and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth
in the Convention."74 The ICJ gave the United States wide discretion
70. See id. 77 (holding that Article 36(1) creates individual rights); see also
Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (holding that the Vienna Convention "arguably" creates
individually enforceable rights); Trainer, supra note 7, at 257-58 (looking at the
drafters' intent in the Vienna Convention to conclude that the treaty clearly
bestows private rights upon individuals).
71. See discussion supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (observing the
U.S. misinterpretation of the ICJ provisional measures staying the execution of
Angel Breard).
72. See LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 110 (concluding that the Order "was not a
mere exhortation" and that it "was consequently binding in character and created a
legal obligation for the United States"). After issuing provisional measures that the
United States chose to ignore in both the Breard and LaGrand cases, the ICJ
underscored the binding nature of its Orders and highlighted that the United States
was in violation of its legal obligation. Id. at 109.
73. See Too Sovereign, supra note 25, at 2654 (stating that the LaGrand ruling
is noteworthy because it declared that ICJ provisions are binding and that the
federal structure of the United States cannot be used as an excuse to prevent the
government from taking meaningful steps to ensure states' compliance with court
orders).
74. LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 125. The terms "review and reconsideration"
leave ample room for interpretation. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 432 (arguing
that the ICJ left the remedy of "review and reconsideration" open to interpretation
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in choosing the means by which review and reconsideration should
occur in stating that "[t]his obligation can be carried out in various
ways. The choice of means must be left to the United States."75
This language discussing the remedy of "review and
reconsideration" is extremely important as the courts test in Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals the international obligations LaGrand
bestowed upon the United States. 76 Avena presents the major issues
of what remedy should be provided in the case of a Vienna
Convention violation and what the United States should do to
implement the Avena ruling effectively.7
3. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States)
The most recent decision regarding a violation of Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention came from the ICJ in the spring of 2004 in Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals.78 While the facts are almost identical
in order to accommodate the variances among different criminal justice systems
that would be interpreting the remedy).
75. LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 125. But see Jeremy White, A New Remedy
Stresses the Need for International Education: The Impact of the LaGrand Case on
a Domestic Court's Violation of a Foreign National's Consular Relations Rights
Under the Vienna Convention, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 295, 309-12
(2003) (concluding that despite the discretion given to the United States to carry
out the remedy under LaGrand, the United States nevertheless has a duty to
perform its international obligations, particularly when the United States is gaining
a poor international reputation).
76. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128,
120-21 (Mar. 31) (discussing LaGrand as the precedent for determining a
remedy for Mexico); see also Avena Application, supra note 30, IT 1-2 (alleging
that the United States violated Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention); Sarah
M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S.
Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations., 91 CAL. L. REV.
1729, 1759 (2003) (noting that Mexico's application emphasizes the failure of U.S.
courts to comply with the LaGrand ruling).
77. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 117-18 (establishing the Mexican request for
relief in the form of restitutio in integrum and the U.S. argument for relief in the
form of review and reconsideration as established by LaGrand); see also Ray,
supra note 76, at 1763 (suggesting that the ICJ may be willing to "go out on a
limb" in Avena in order to prescribe a stronger remedy than the one provided in
LaGrand).
78. See generally Avena, 2004 ICJ 128 (detailing the factual findings and the
ICJ's conclusion).
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to the factual scenarios presented in Breard and LaGrand,79 the ICJ
has further outlined its holding in LaGrand and has set forth a
specific remedy with which the United States must comply. 80
Furthermore, this case presents a precedential opportunity for the
United States to implement an ICJ decision in such a way as to have
a pragmatic effect on the lives of the defendants now alive, albeit on
death row, in the United States.81
a. Facts Presented in the Application Instituting Proceedings
In January of 2003, the government of Mexico instituted
proceedings in the ICJ against the United States for alleged
violations of the Vienna Convention.82 Mexico claimed that U.S.
authorities did not notify "without delay" its fifty-two defendants
8 3
on death row of their rights under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
79. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a (summarizing the facts presented in
Mexico's application instituting proceedings before the ICJ).
80. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 153 (enumerating the ICJ's vote and
consequent holding for each claim). The ICJ held by a vote of fourteen to one on
several specific aspects of the case that the United States had breached its
obligations under the Vienna Convention. Id.
81. See discussion infra Part III (suggesting methods by which the United
States can actively incorporate the Avena ruling into domestic law).
82. See Avena Application, supra note 30, 2-3 (alleging that violations of
Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention have resulted in unfair sentences); see
also Too Sovereign, supra note 25, at 2670 (proposing that the United States will
have to interpret LaGrand through the most recent application before the ICJ
regarding violations of the Vienna Convention, Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals).
83. Memorial of Mexico (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128, Written Pleadings, 89
(June 20, 2003) [hereinafter Memorial of Mexico], available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). Former
Governor Ryan of Illinois commuted three convictions and sentences, but Mexico
pursued those cases and sought a remedy for the alleged Article 36 violations
regardless. Id. 89, n.114. See Verbatim Record (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ
Pleadings 24 84 (Dec. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Verbatim Record of Dec. 151
(referring to fifty-two defendants who allege that U.S. officials violated their
Vienna Convention rights), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). For the
purposes of this case note, the number of defendants referred to will be fifty-two,
given that Mexico originally submitted fifty-four cases but later withdrew two of
them. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 16 (enumerating each defendant's name and
noting that Mexico withdrew two of the defendants' cases).
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Convention before being detained, tried, convicted, and sentenced to
death.14 Although Mexico has been pursuing challenges to the
convictions through U.S. domestic judicial proceedings, it further
alleged that the United States "refused" to allow relief for the alleged
violations and refused to guarantee that further violations will not
occur.
8 5
The typical scenario in each case includes proceedings against the
defendant that began and concluded, in part if not altogether, before
U.S. officials notified the Mexican government of the defendant's
detention.86 Mexico claimed that: (1) the United States violated its
obligation to Mexico to inform the government of a detained
Mexican national; (2) the United States violated its obligation to the
individual to inform him of his right to speak to a consulate; (3) the
United States violated its obligation to Mexico to allow it access to
its citizens; and (4) the United States violated the Convention by
84. See Ray, supra note 76, at 1759 (noting that diplomatic efforts, in addition
to judicial efforts, failed to provide the defendants with any relief). Because of the
alleged violation, Mexico states that it was not able to exercise its rights or perform
its consular functions according to the Vienna Convention. See Avena Application,
supra note 30, 2 (claiming injury to the State of Mexico and to its nationals
because they lacked the opportunity to exercise their rights).
85. See Avena Application, supra note 30, 4 (stating that Mexico has pursued
judicial and diplomatic negotiations with the United States, but nevertheless the
U.S. government has "refused" to provide adequate relief or guarantees of
cessation). Mexico characterizes the dispute as one where the United States and
Mexico disagree on the rights included in the Vienna Convention, the meaning of
those rights, and the remedy that should be available when a violation occurs. Id.
5.
86. See Avena Application, supra note 30, 7 69-267 (identifying each
individual case and the stages in which proceedings currently stand); see also
Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 90-91 (noting that in thirty of the cases, the
defendants were tried, convicted and sentenced to death before the Mexican
consulate learned of their cases). In twenty-four cases, Mexico learned of the
detentions before trial, but the prosecution had already obtained incriminating
statements and other incriminating evidence. See Avena Application, supra note
30, T 68 (finding that although the United States made attempts to comply with the
consular notification requirement, the United States did not make such attempts
before the start of trial, which constitutes "delay"). In forty-nine of the cases, there
is "no evidence" that the competent authorities attempted to comply with Article
36 before the government tried, convicted, and sentenced the defendants to death.
Id. In only four of the cases does Mexico find that the authorities made some
attempt to comply with Article 36 but did not do so "without delay." Id.
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failing to give full effect to the rights of the Convention in U.S.
domestic law.87
b. Provisional Measures Staying the Executions of Three
Defendants
The same day Mexico submitted its application instituting
proceedings to the ICJ, it filed a request for the indication of
provisional measures.8" The United States argued that clemency
proceedings would fulfill the obligation to provide review and
87. See Avena Application, supra note 30, T 279 (stating its specific claims
against the United States, including U.S. unwillingness "to take steps sufficient 'to
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under
[Article 36(1)] are intended' (Vienna Convention, Article 36(2))"). But see Ray,
supra note 76, at 1769 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court is the only court with
jurisdiction to issue a remedy to Mexico).
88. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ 128,
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Order of February 5, 2003
[hereinafter Avena Order], IT 2-7 (reiterating Mexico's arguments regarding the
U.S. violations of the Vienna Convention and the need to litigate the issue before
the ICJ, which would have no meaning were the Mexican defendants executed on
schedule), available at http://www/icj-cij .org/icjwww/idocket/imus/
imusframe.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). In the application, Mexico argued that,
because of the alleged violations by the United States and the pending nature of the
cases, the ICJ should indicate provisional measures staying the imminent
executions of three defendants as fulfillment of the obligation from LaGrand to
grant review and reconsideration where a Convention violation has occurred. Id.
Furthermore, Mexico relied on the LaGrand decision to argue that there should be
an indication for provisional measures when a Vienna Convention violation has
occurred because the appropriate remedy is review and reconsideration, which
cannot occur if the defendants are not alive and present to receive a benefit from
that remedy. Id. 3. In opposition to the indication of provisional measures, the
United States argued that LaGrand did not establish a right to restoration of the
status quo ante under the Vienna Convention. Id. 30. See also Alan Macina,
Avena & Other Mexican Nationals: The Litmus for LaGrand & the Future of
Consular Rights in the United States, 34 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 115, 137 (2003)
(concluding that Mexico avoided the mistakes of Breard and LaGrand by
requesting provisional measures very early on in the ICJ's adjudication of the
case). Perhaps in recognition of previous cases where the United States declined to
find ICJ Order's to be binding, Mexico filed its application for provisional
measures in a very timely manner. Id. See also Schiffman, supra note 48, at 50-52
(arguing that because the LaGrand decision was only binding on those parties,
only German defendants may receive review and reconsideration pursuant to that
holding).
42320051
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
reconsideration, whereas Mexico believed that these proceedings
were "standardless, secretive and unreviewable." 9
After balancing the parties' interests and finding sufficient
urgency in the situations of three defendants, the ICJ indicated
provisional measures ordering the United States to "take all measures
necessary to ensure" that the appropriate U.S. authorities did not
execute the defendants before domestic courts issued a final
judgment.90 To date, the United States has complied with this
Order.91
c. Relief Mexico Sought For the Alleged Violations
Because Avena presents the first opportunity for an ICJ decision to
have a practical impact both in the lives of the defendants and in U.S.
domestic courts, 92 the remedy the ICJ issued and the application of
this remedy in U.S. courts is arguably the most important aspect of
this case. 93 In requesting three specific forms of relief, Mexico first
asked the ICJ to declare that the United States did in fact violate its
obligation to Mexico under the Vienna Convention. 94 Second,
89. Avena Order, supra note 88, 45. See Linda E. Carter, Compliance With
ICJ Provisional Measures and the Meaning of Review and Reconsideration Under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 117, 129 (2003) (defining clemency
as "virtually undefined substantively and procedurally" so that there is no standard
for determining how the clemency process functions). Scholars agree that
clemency proceedings are extremely discretionary and essentially unreviewable in
judicial proceedings. Id.
90. See Too Sovereign, supra note 25, at 2671 (noting that the provisional
measures in Avena use mandatory language ("shall") whereas the Breard language
was more suggestive ("should")).
91. See Liptak, supra note 36 (arguing that had the ICJ not issued that Order,
and had the United States not complied with it, those three defendants would
currently be dead).
92. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128,
153 (Mar. 31) (suggesting specifically in part (10) that the Avena case presents
the first opportunity for an ICJ decision to have a practical impact in U.S. courts).
93. See discussion infra Part III (arguing for the implementation of the Avena
decision in U.S. courts).
94. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 89-92 (arguing that the United
States violated the defendants' right to speak with the Mexican consulate, and that
the United States violated Mexico's right to provide protection for its defendants).
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Mexico sought relief in the form of restitutio in integrum, meaning
that the situation should be returned to its status as if the violations
had never occurred.95 Finally, Mexico requested the ICJ to order the
United States to cease its violations of the Vienna Convention and to
guarantee that further Vienna Convention violations would not
occur.
96
Mexico's application reflects its extreme frustration with United
States-Mexico relations regarding capital cases.97 Mexico cited four
95. See Avena Application, supra note 30, 277 (noting Mexico further
requests that it "should be granted restitutio in integrum in each case in which
competent authorities of the United States sentenced a Mexican national to death
following proceedings in which those authorities failed to respect Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention"); see also Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 352-55
(requesting the ICJ to order the United States to take all steps necessary to ensure
that restitutio in integrum results to the fullest extent possible). This form of relief
must enable "full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under [Article 36] are intended." Id. In its interpretation of restitutio in integrum,
Mexico asks that (1) the convictions and sentences of all the defendants in this
proceeding be vacated, (2) all evidence obtained in violation of Article 36 be
excluded from any future criminal proceeding against these defendants, and (3) the
United States must refrain from applying its domestic law in such a way as to
preclude the enforcement of Vienna Convention rights. Id.; see also Avena
Application, supra note 30, 279 (seeking assurance that appropriate authorities
will comply with Article 36 and finding that the only way to ensure compliance is
through a modification of municipal law).
96. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 398-406 (arguing that the
United States must cease its on-going violations of the Vienna Convention and that
it must guarantee not to repeat violations of its international legal obligations).
97. See Vanessa Maaskamp, Extradition and Life Imprisonment, 25 LoY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 741, 743-44 (2003) (discussing the complicated relations
between Mexico and the United States regarding the death penalty because the
Mexican constitution merely contemplates, but does not apply, the death penalty
whereas the United States does apply this penalty); see also Avena Application,
supra note 30, 39 (arguing that even a declaration of inadequate counsel as a
reason for failing to bring the claim at trial court is not adequate cause for the
claim to enter appellate or federal proceedings). Mexican nationals have not
received any relief in U.S. state courts because generally the doctrine of procedural
default applies and therefore the defendants cannot raise their claims in appellate
and federal proceedings. Id. See also Burks, supra note 35, at 43-44 (arguing that
defense attorneys would be well-served to inquire about every defendant's
nationality so an allegation of a Vienna Convention violation can be properly
raised at the state court level rather than submitting the allegation to the "rigors" of
appellate review or a habeas corpus petition). The procedural default rule
functions generally to prohibit defendants from raising the Vienna Convention
violation at any level but the state court level. Id. Yet if a defendant has inadequate
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cases in which it filed diplomatic notes with the U.S. government to
protest certain executions and to emphasize U.S. failure to provide
the defendant with his right to consular notification.98 In each case,
the United States carried out the execution nonetheless, writing a
letter of apology after each execution to express its regret that the
appropriate authorities had not complied with the Vienna
Convention.99 In light of Mexico's experience with the United States
in death penalty cases-consisting of ineffective diplomatic protests
and fruitless judicial interventions-it is understandable that
Mexico's application insists on redress and remedy in U.S. domestic
courts. 00
d. The Holding of the ICJ in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
The ICJ ruled on Mexico's application in its decision Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals on March 31, 2004.101 After determining
counsel who fails to raise the claim, the defendant is essentially out of luck
because inadequate counsel does not constitute "cause" or "prejudice" in showing
that the procedural default rule operated unfairly against him. Id. at 44-45. See also
Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding no showing of
prejudice because Murphy did not establish that contacting the Mexican consulate
would have changed his guilty plea or sentence). The Fourth Circuit found that a
"reasonably diligent attorney" would have uncovered the applicability of the
Vienna Convention during the pre-trial process so that it does not constitute cause
for demonstrating that the trial would have gone any differently had the defendant
had access to his consulate. Id.
98. See Avena Application, supra note 30, 69-267 (citing the cases of Irineo
Tristan Montoya, Mario Benjamin Murphy, Miguel Angel Flores, and Javier
Sudrez Medina, in which Mexico protested the executions through diplomatic
notes and asserted the violation of the Vienna Convention).
99. See id. (finding that after the fourth instance in which the United States
ignored Mexico's protest to the execution, Mexican President Vicente Fox
cancelled an official visit to the United States in protest of the violation of
international law). The U.S. government never formally apologized to the Mexican
government for the breach. Id.
100. See Macina, supra note 88, at 137 (noting that Mexico is asking the ICJ to
expand its power from the LaGrand holding by requesting that the United States
not apply its municipal law in such a way as to bar full application of the Vienna
Convention rights); see also Ray, supra note 76, at 1766 (observing that the United
States is unlikely to comply fully or satisfactorily with the ICJ ruling in Avena so
that the U.S. judiciary must implement the decision instead).
101. See generally Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004
ICJ 128 (Mar. 31) (holding that the United States violated Article 36 of the Vienna
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that the ICJ had jurisdiction to rule on all of Mexico's claims, 10 2 the
ICJ also determined that Mexico's claims were all admissible. 103
Proceeding to the merits of the case, the ICJ found that the United
States violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention by not
informing the fifty-one defendants of their right to consular access.1°4
The ICJ found that the United States should have adequately inquired
into the nationality of these defendants,'05 and in forty-seven of those
cases the United States should have informed them of their right to
speak to a consulate "without delay.'
0 6
The ICJ further found that the United States violated its obligation
to inform Mexico in a timely manner that it was detaining Mexican
nationals.0 7 The United States also thereby violated Article 36's
provisions part l(a) and (c) by depriving Mexico of the opportunity
"to communicate with and have access to [forty-nine] nationals and
to visit them in detention."'0 8 With regard to multiple defendants, the
Convention in the cases of fifty-one Mexican nationals).
102. See id. 27-35 (overruling, one by one, the U.S. objections to the ICJ's
jurisdiction over the various claims).
103. See id. 37, 40, 42, 44, 47 (declaring that Mexico's claims were
admissible based on ICJ precedent).
104. See id. 153-4 ("by not informing, without delay upon their detention, the
51 Mexican nationals ... of their rights under Article 36, paragraph l(b), of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, the United States of
America breached the obligations incumbent upon it under that subparagraph.").
105. See id. 66, 74 (finding that in the case of a fifty-second Mexican
national, Mr. Salcido, the U.S. authorities had no indications of Mexican
nationality that should have caused a rapid inquiry into the true nature of his
citizenship).
106. See id. 76 (noting that the right to be informed of consular access does not
turn upon an officer's assumptions of whether the defendant actually wishes to
speak to the consulate).
107. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 153-55 ("by not notifying the appropriate
Mexican consular post without delay of the detention of the forty-nine Mexican
nationals ... and thereby depriving the United Mexican States of the right, in a
timely fashion, to render the assistance provided for by the Vienna Convention to
the individuals concerned, the United States of America breached the obligations
incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b).").
108. See id. 93, 97, 106(3), 153(6) (concluding that of the fifty-one
defendants on death row, the United States adequately recognized the consular
notification rights of Mr. Juarez (case No. 10) and Mr. Hern~ndez (case No. 34) by
either informing them of their right or by directly contacting the consulate for
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ICJ found that the United States violated its obligation "to enable
Mexican consular officers to arrange for legal representation of their
nationals."'' 9 Finally, the ICJ found that the United States complied
with its obligations under Article 36(2) to provide "review and
reconsideration" as provided for by LaGrand in all but three cases.1 0
The ICJ then proceeded to discuss the legal consequences of U.S.
breaches of its obligations under Article 36.111 Relying on its
LaGrand decision that the United States must provide review and
reconsideration in the case of a Vienna Convention violation, the ICJ
further clarified this holding in very distinct terms.1 2 While
reiterating the remedy of "review and reconsideration" in the case of
a Vienna Convention violation, the ICJ specified that such review
and reconsideration must occur "with a view to ascertaining whether
in each case the violation of Article 36 committed by the competent
authorities caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of
administration of criminal justice."' 1 3
them).
109. See id. 106(4) (listing the thirty-four cases in which, "by virtue of [the
United States'] breaches of Article 36, paragraph l(b)," the defendants were not
able to receive assistance in obtaining legal representation from their consulate).
110. See id. 113-14 (holding that review and reconsideration is still possible
in all but three cases because the cases have not "reach[ed] a state at which there is
no further possibility ofjudicial re-examination").
111. See id. 115 (reiterating the violation of the United States to fulfill its
obligations under Article 36(2) in failing to observe its obligations under Article
26(l)(b)).
112. See id. 120-21 (quoting from LaGrand to establish the principle by
which the ICJ must abide in the present decision and stating that the remedy
"should consist in [sic] an obligation on the United States to permit review and
reconsideration of these national's cases"); see also William J. Aceves, Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States). Provisional Measures Order.
At <http://www.ICJ.cij-org>. International Court of Justice, February 5, 2003., 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 923, 929 (2003) (stating that "Avena provides the International
Court of Justice with a unique opportunity to clarify its prior judgment in
LaGrand").
113. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 121 (creating a specific review and
reconsideration remedy for failing in an obligation of consular notification, which
was absent from the LaGrand decision); see also Drinan, supra note 46, at 1317
(suggesting that "prejudice analysis" could become very important in how U.S.
courts evaluate relief for an Article 36 violation). The addition of the "prejudice"
analysis could be very influential in U.S. courts. Id.
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In deciding that the remedy of review and reconsideration applied
to the Avena case, the ICJ denied Mexico's requests for "partial or
total annulment of conviction or sentence," 1 4 declined to determine
whether the Vienna Convention creates a "human right,""' 5 and
denied Mexico's request for application of the exclusionary rule." 6
While the ICJ emphasized that the review and reconsideration
process should be effective," 7 it deferred to the United States in
determining the outcome of the review and reconsideration
process."' Finally, the ICJ denied Mexico's request for a guarantee
114. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 123 (differentiating this case from annulment
of conviction precedent because convicting and sentencing the defendants was not
a violation of international law, but rather was a breach of a treaty obligation).
115. See id. 124 (observing that "neither the text nor the object and purpose of
the Convention, nor any indication in the traveaux pr~paratoires," support
Mexico's assertion that the right to consular notification and communication is a
right under the Vienna Convention); see also Richardson III, supra note 62, at 127
(citing a view that the rights created in the Vienna Convention include a right to a
fair trial regarding the imposition of the death penalty). Some commentators are
willing to find that the Vienna Convention does create a human right. Id.; see also
Bishop, supra note 4, at 43-45 (noting that the ICJ, the Inter-American Court, and
the U.S. Supreme Court have all recognized, in one way or another, that Article 36
likely creates individual rights).
116. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 126-27 (finding that the United States would
necessarily decide whether to apply the exclusionary rule on a case-by-case
analysis); see also analysis infra text accompanying note 224 (perceiving that U.S.
courts do not treat a Vienna Convention violation as meriting the remedy of the
exclusionary rule because the treaty does not create rights on par with
constitutional rights). U.S. domestic law only allows for application of the
exclusionary rule when a constitutional right has been violated. Id.
117. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 138 (concluding that the United States should
"guarantee that the violation and the possible prejudice caused by that violation
will be fully examined and taken into account in the review and reconsideration
process").
118. See id. 139 (highlighting that the crucial aspect is "the existence of a
procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights
set forth in the Vienna Convention," and not the outcome of that procedure). The
ICJ further wrote that "[t]he rights guaranteed under the Vienna Convention are
treaty rights which the United States has undertaken to comply with in relation to
the individual concerned, irrespective of the due process rights under United States
constitutional law." Id. See also Ray, supra note 76, at 1764-65 (arguing that
"review" could require a "complete examination of the record" in order to establish
whether a Vienna Convention violation actually occurred, and that
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of non-repetition and cessation. 119
The ICJ's holding in Avena is extremely important with regard to
U.S. implementation of decisions arising out of Vienna Convention
disputes. 12' Because this case establishes a clear and concise remedy
for the rights the ICJ established in LaGrand, U.S. courts should
begin implementing this decision as the latest authority on the issue
of Article 36 rights. 121
II. ANALYSIS
A. THE RULINGS OF THE ICJ ON THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN A VENA
AND OTHER MEXICAN NATIONALS
In both the Breard and LaGrand cases, the United States ignored
ICJ orders staying the execution of the defendants. 22 However, the
"reconsideration" would require as much as a retrial or application of the
exclusionary rule). However, the United States does not have complete discretion
because review and reconsideration does mandate a thorough examination of the
case to determine whether a violation of Article 36 has occurred. Id.
119. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 150 (determining that the United States has
engaged in sufficient activity as to demonstrate its genuine attempt not to repeat
and to cease the Vienna Convention violations).
120. See Drinan, supra note 46, at 1307-10 (discussing the reasons why U.S.
courts have failed to interpret LaGrand correctly and the general confusion that
U.S. courts maintain about the jurisdiction of the ICJ over Vienna Convention
disputes).
121. See discussion infra Part III (recommending that the United States
implement the Avena decision as binding authority given that international law
calls for such treatment of the case).
122. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 16-42 (finding that Paraguay attempted to
enforce the order staying Breard's execution but did not continue to litigate the
claim after authorities executed Breard). Breard asked the U.S. Supreme Court to
enforce the ICJ's order to stay his execution but the Supreme Court denied all
pending requests for relief and officials executed Breard anyway. Id. at 22-23. In
addition, while Arizona authorities executed Karl LaGrand before his case ever
reached the ICJ, an ICJ order stayed Walter LaGrand's execution. Id. at 35-37.
Arizona, however, ignored the provisional measure and executed him nonetheless.
Id. See also Too Sovereign, supra note 25, at 2666 (noting that Germany pursued
its case in the ICJ even though Arizona authorities had executed both of the
LaGrand men). Therefore, the ICJ issued its ultimate ruling in the LaGrand case
with the knowledge that the United States had already executed both LaGrand
brothers, which arguably minimized the impact of the decision. Id.
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United States has honored the ICJ order staying the execution of
three of the Mexican defendants.123 Because U.S. authorities have not
yet executed any of the defendants, the Avena ruling is an
unprecedented opportunity for the United States to implement an ICJ
ruling in domestic courts and to impact practically the defendants'
cases. 124
1. The ICJ Correctly Found that it has Jurisdiction Over Mexico's
Claims and that Mexico's Claims are Admissible
a. Jurisdiction
In Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, the ICJ correctly found
that it has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. 25 Mexico
123. See Liptak, supra note 36 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
hear the case in which Osbaldo Torres asked the Court to honor the ICJ order
staying his execution, but that the Oklahoma attorney general, Drew Edmundson,
asked a state appeals court to honor the order "out of courtesy" to the ICJ).
124. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 346-47 (observing that for the
first time, because the Mexican defendants are still alive, the ICJ has an
opportunity to grant relief that will benefit the defendants); see also Counter-
Memorial of the United States (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128, Written Pleadings,
1.13 (Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Counter-Memorial of the United States] (arguing
that a different remedy should not be accorded in this case simply because these
defendants are alive and the defendants in LaGrand were not), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2005). The United States remains in denial of the importance of this matter,
arguing that the fact that the Mexican defendants are still alive is only a small
difference from LaGrand where the German defendants had already been executed
at the time of the ICJ's decision. Id. See also Verbatim Record of Dec. 15, supra
note 83, 25-26 (asserting that the ICJ may resolve issues in Avena that were
materially impossible to resolve in previous cases, "but which lie at the heart of the
present proceedings"). It seems rather credulous and ingenuous, however, to
disregard so nonchalantly the difference between life and death. Id.
125. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128,
153 (Mar. 31) (rejecting the objections made by the United States against the
jurisdiction of the ICJ); see also Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 27-28
(basing jurisdiction on Article I of the Optional Protocol's mandate that "[d]isputes
arising out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations] shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the [ICJ]"). In
its application instituting proceedings, Mexico argued that the ICJ had jurisdiction
based upon the Vienna Convention and the Optional Protocol. Id. See also
discussion supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (establishing that, due to the
Optional Protocol, the Vienna Convention is binding upon the United States).
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properly asserted in its application to the ICJ that the Avena case met
the two requirements for jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol: the
United States is a party to the Protocol, and the dispute arises out of
interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention. 12 6
In fact, the United States did not dispute that the ICJ has
jurisdiction under the Vienna Convention and the Optional
Protocol.'27 Rather, the United States contested the jurisdiction of the
ICJ by arguing that Mexico reached too far in its application and that
the ICJ is not a "supreme court of a global State."'28 However, the
ICJ had already spoken on most of the U.S. contests to its
jurisdiction.'29 In Avena, as in LaGrand, the ICJ needed to do nothing
more than apply the relevant international law to the issues, which
did "not convert [the] Court into a court of appeal of national
criminal proceedings."'' 30 The ICJ had jurisdiction to hear the case
because all of the United States' objections went to the merits of the
case and not to jurisdiction alone.'
126. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 28 (finding that the two
requirements for the ICJ to have jurisdiction over a case (1) that the applicants are
parties to the Optional Protocol and (2) the dispute arises out of the meaning and
scope of the Vienna Convention).
127. See Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 124, 3.1 (agreeing
that the ICJ has jurisdiction pursuant to the treaty and the Protocol, but arguing that
the dispute did not arise out of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations).
128. See Verbatim Record (Mex.' v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ Translation of Oral
Pleadings 26 14 (Dec. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Verbatim Record Translation of
Dec. 16], (alleging that such a "super supreme court" role is contrary to ICJ
precedent and "the basic principles of international law), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2005). The United States argued that Mexico essentially asked the ICJ to be a court
of criminal appeal by asking the ICJ to review and vacate convictions and
sentences. Id. 1.12.
129. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ 104, 128 (June 27)
(ruling that the ICJ had jurisdiction to hear all of Germany's claims on the basis of
the Optional Protocol).
130. See id. 52 (relating the ICJ's opinion that Germany asked the court to "do
nothing more than apply the relevant rules of international law to the issues in
dispute").
131. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 28, 30, 34, 35 (concluding that the lCJ has
jurisdiction over Mexico's claims in all four of the U.S. objections to the ICJ's
jurisdiction); see also Ray, supra note 76, at 1763 (inferring that the ICJ order of
provisional measures indicates a willingness to reach the merits of the Avena case
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b. Admissibility
Furthermore, the ICJ correctly found Mexico's claims admissible
given that the court had already considered many of the United
States' arguments against admissibility and found them
immaterial. 3 2 The ICJ clearly held in LaGrand that applying rules of
international law did not convert the ICJ into "a court of appeal of
national criminal proceedings.' ' 3  As in LaGrand, the ICJ in Avena
declined to uphold the United States' arguments that the ICJ
converted itself into a court of criminal appeal and that Mexico did
not exhaust local remedies. 134
itself). Accordingly, the ICJ also had the jurisdiction to consider possible remedies.
Id.
132. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 37, 40, 42, 44, 47 (Mar. 31) (declining to
uphold any of the United States' five arguments against the admissibility of
Mexico's claims); see also LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 49-64 (holding that all of
Germany's claims were admissible where the United States argued that they were
not admissible because (1) Germany asked the ICJ to serve as a court of criminal
appeal, (2) Germany inappropriately brought the matter to the ICJ, (3) Germany
had not exhausted local remedies, and (4) Germany did not provide parallel
remedies in its own practice, thereby violating notions of reciprocity). The ICJ's
determination on the admissibility issues was not surprising given its stature in
LaGrand regarding similar arguments against admissibility. Id.
133. See LaGrand 2001 ICJ 104, 56 (stating that the ICJ is not a court of
criminal appeal for jurisdictional purposes); see also Counter-Memorial of the
United States, supra note 124, 7 4.2 (alleging that there is no reason for the ICJ to
consider each case involving a breach of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations because the United States already possesses the needed review and
reconsideration process in its national courts). The United States argued that
Mexico's claims were inadmissible because Mexico was asking the ICJ to function
as a court of criminal appeal. Id. See also LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 58-60
(establishing that Germany was not required to exhaust local remedies when the
procedural default rule barred it from doing so). Moreover, the ICJ also stated in
LaGrand that the United States could not rely on the rule of exhaustion of local
remedies when the procedural default rule effectively prevented the defendants
from exhausting local remedies, which is the case here as well. Id. See also
Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 124, 4.5 (explaining that
"[e]xhaustion is a well established principle of international law" and that "it is
well-settled that failure to exhaust [local] remedies renders such a claim
admissible"). The United States argued that Mexico had not exhausted local
remedies and, therefore, its claims were inadmissible. Id.
134. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, $$ 37, 40 (finding that the United States'
objections to admissibility could not be upheld because they were based on
arguments that required the ICJ to reach the merits of the case).
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While the United States also argued that factual issues barred
admissibility,135 the ICJ appropriately found that the factual issues
were in dispute and would not necessarily render Mexico's claims
inadmissible.136 This conclusion further supports the proposition that
the ICJ correctly dismissed the United States' argument that
Mexico's claims were inadmissible. 137
2. The ICJ Correctly Found That the United States in Fact Violated
the Vienna Convention in at least Some of the Fifty-Two Cases
a. Violations of Article 36(1)
In at least some of the fifty-two cases that Mexico presented to the
ICJ there were clear violations of Article 36(1) of the Vienna
Convention, especially in those cases where defendants had a trial
135. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 312 (arguing that detained
foreign nationals face greater obstacles than detained nationals); see also Counter-
Memorial of the United States, supra note 124, 4.12 (contending that there
cannot be a violation of the Vienna Convention where the detained individual is a
U.S. national). The United States claims that some defendants were U.S. nationals
at the time of arrest, and that even when Mexico did know about the Vienna
Convention violations, its government failed to act promptly. Id.
136. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 42 (determining that disputes over the
nationality of the defendants in the case are ones of merit, not of admissibility); see
also Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic
Abstention by the International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399, 407-8
(1997) (discussing the ICJ's jurisdiction as including legal disputes and extending
to advisory opinions). The ICJ also has jurisdiction in more scenarios than the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, because it can render advisory opinions. Id.
137. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 47 (concluding that even if Mexico's practices
were not in compliance with Article 36, such a finding would not be a bar to
admissibility of its claims); see also LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 63 (finding that the
crimes, punishments and remedies vary from State to State, such that the parties to
the dispute cannot be expected to have identical remedies when one State does not
hand down such severe penalties such as the death penalty). Mexico does not have
an obligation to ensure that its own criminal justice contains a system of remedies
equal to the one that it asked the United States to provide for in the case of an
allegation of a Vienna Convention rights violation. Id. See also Avena, 2004 ICJ
128, 153 (rejecting all five objections from the United States with regard to the
admissibility of Mexico's claims). Therefore, all of Mexico's claims are
admissible. Id.
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and sentencing proceedings without access to the Mexican
consulate. 38 The ICJ delineated the Article 36(1) allegations by
subsection, thereby finding that the United States breached its duty
under Article 36(1)(b) to notify fifty-one of the defendants of their
right to speak to the Mexican consulate.1 39 Importantly, the ICJ
construed the terms "without delay" under Article 36(1)(b) to mean
that there is "a duty upon the arresting authorities to give that
information to an arrested person as soon as it is realized that the
person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that
138. See Avena Application, supra note 30, 69-267 (stating the facts of each
case including the situations where defendants were sentenced to the death penalty
without ever having the opportunity to claim a violation of the Vienna
Convention); see also Verbatim Record of Dec. 15, supra note 83, TT 84-92
(arguing that none of the defendants were dual nationals at the time of their
arrests); Verbatim Record of Dec. 16, supra note 128, 4.9-4.12 (arguing that
because at least some of the defendants were not Mexican nationals at the time of
their arrest, they were not per se entitled to consular notification). Mexico and the
United States disputed many of the facts of the case, including whether all the
defendants were Mexican nationals at the time of their arrests. Id. See also
Verbatim Record of Dec. 15, supra note 83, 94 (finding that through either
judicial proceedings or admissions of U.S. authorities, there has already been a
conclusion that violations occurred in twelve cases). Mexico asserted that the
United States had gone so far as to concede to violations of Article 36(1) in twelve
of the fifty-two cases. Id. See also Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra
note 124, 4.12-4.17 (arguing that many of the defendants were either United
States citizens or represented themselves as citizens). The United States
maintained that in many cases, the defendants represented themselves to be U.S.
citizens and that the competent authorities had no reason to believe otherwise. Id.
The United States further argued that many of the defendants had lived in the U.S.
for five years or more, were fluent in English, or were familiar with the criminal
justice system since they had criminal records. Id.
139. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 106(1)-(3) (holding that the United States
breached its duty under Article 36(1)(b) "to inform detained Mexican nationals of
their rights under that paragraph" in fifty-one cases and breached its duty under
Article 36(l)(b) to notify the Mexican consular post of the detention of the
Mexican nationals in forty-nine cases). Under its consideration of the violation of
Article 36(1)(b) and the U.S. duty to inform detained Mexican nationals of their
right to speak to a consulate, the ICJ decided two important sub-issues regarding:
(1) the question of the nationality of the detained individuals; and (2) the meaning
of the terms "without delay." Id. 52. The Court found that Mexico had the duty
of proving that its defendants had Mexican nationality at the time of arrest, but that
if the United States contested that the defendants also had U.S. citizenship, then the
United States had the burden of proving as much. Id. 57.
2005] 435
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
the person is probably a foreign national."'4 ° Because the ICJ found
that the United States violated its Article 36(l)(b) duty, the ICJ also
found that the United States violated its duty under Article 36(l)(a),
regarding those same fifty-one defendants, to enable Mexico "to
communicate with its nationals and have access to them.''
The ICJ found that the United States violated its duty under
Article 36(l)(c) "regarding the right of consular officers to visit their
detained nationals" with regard to those fifty-one defendants, 42 and
the duty "to enable Mexican consular officers to arrange for legal
representation of their nationals" in thirty-four cases, as well.'43
Because the Court had the full factual record before it and considered
each case on an individual basis,'" it is likely that the Court correctly
found the United States in violation of its obligations under Article
36(1) of the Vienna Convention.145
140. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 87-88 (noting that there is not a duty to inform
the detained national of his right to speak to a consulate "immediately" upon arrest,
as Mexico argued).
141. See id. 106(3) (noting that the United States breached its duty under
Article 36(l)(a) "to enable Mexican consular officers to communicate with and
have access to their nationals"). In some cases, U.S. actions effectively prevented
Mexico from exercising these rights for prolonged time periods. Id. 102.
142. See id. (emphasizing the importance of upholding the right of
communication regardless of whether or not Mexico chose to utilize it).
143. See id., 106(4) (listing the names of the fifty-one defendants affected by
the actions of the United States).
144. See id. TT 66-77 (analyzing the facts of seven cases where the United States
claimed that the arrested Mexicans were U.S. citizens, thereby showing that the
Court considered each case individually with regard to nationality, and stating that
it was necessary to examine the expression "without delay" with regard to four
particular cases).
145. See Macina, supra note 88, at 131-133 (discussing the case of Cesar
Roberto Fierro Reyna, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that
Fierro's confession was likely coerced and his due process rights were violated, as
an example of "the substantive reasons Mexico seeks redress for consular
notification violations of [sic] behalf of so many of its nationals" ). Fierro claimed
that police coerced his confession through a threat to his parents. Id. at 132.
Mexico contended that had the consulate been aware of Fierro's detention, it could
have extracted his parents from detention. Id. at 133.
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b. Violations of Article 36(2)
The ICJ also correctly found that the United States violated Article
36(2) of the Vienna Convention when it failed to give "full effect" to
the rights enumerated under Article 36(1) in all but three cases. 46
U.S. municipal law operated effectively to deny the defendants an
opportunity to challenge their convictions and sentences because
either the procedural default rule precluded the defendants from
contesting their sentences, or U.S. courts failed to create an effective
remedy for the Vienna Convention violations. 47
The ICJ properly relied upon prior case law to establish that the
procedural default rule effectively precluded the defendants from
challenging their convictions and sentences. 48 Looking to LaGrand,
146. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 113-14 (holding that except in the three cases
of Mr. Fierro, Mr. Moreno, and Mr. Torres, all other cases did not reach the stage
at which there is no further possibility of judicial re-examination of those cases, it
was premature for the Court to conclude at this stage that the United States already
violated Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention); see also Macina, supra note 88,
at 134 (stating Mexico's argument that U.S. application of municipal law
constitutes a violation of Article 36(2)).
147. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 209 (arguing that the U.S.
refusal to give full effect to the rights of Article 36(1) also constitutes a breach of
international treaty law); see also Verbatim Record of Dec. 16, supra note 128,
4.25 (discussing the extensive program of pamphlet distribution to law
enforcement officials that state the duties the officials have when arresting a
foreign national). In response, the United States argued that it had made extensive
efforts to comply with its obligations under the Vienna Convention. Id. See also
Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 124, 6.64 (discussing the
Miranda warnings and that a violation of the warnings may include the
misunderstanding that results from a language barrier). The United States also
argued that the U.S. criminal justice system guarantees due process through many
mechanisms, including Miranda warnings, the exclusion of evidence when these
warnings are defective, and procedures allowing claims of ineffective counsel to be
raised at post-trial proceedings. Id. The United States claimed that in some cases
the defendants knew their right to consular access at the time of or shortly after
their arrests but declined to contact the Mexican consular, so no breach of Article
36(2) could have occurred, and that in other cases the violation was known but not
raised in judicial proceedings, which is also not a violation of Article 36(2). Id.
7.12-7.15, 7.17.
148. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 113, 134 (remarking that the United States has
not revised the procedural default rule since the LaGrand decision, such that its
present application effectively precludes a defendant from raising an Article 36
complaint); see also Weinman, supra note 67, at 902 (finding that the procedural
default rule functions to prevent defendants from bringing their claims at any phase
2005]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
the ICJ already determined that the procedural default rule may work
to prevent a defendant from contesting his case, although the rule is
not necessarily a per se violation of international law. 149 In Avena, the
procedural default rule also operated in this way because it prevented
the defendant from contesting his case, resulting in U.S. domestic
courts failing to give full effect to Article 36 rights.150
With regard to Mexico's second contention-that the United
States failed to provide an effective remedy for the violations'l-the
ICJ correctly denied Mexico's submission in forty-eight of the
cases.' As the Court stated, "all possibility is not yet excluded of
'review and reconsideration' of conviction and sentence, as called for
in the LaGrand case;" because the majority of the cases have not yet
exhausted judicial proceedings, it would be "premature" for the
Court to find that the United States violated Article 36(2). 113 As long
as there remains an opportunity for U.S. courts to provide review and
reconsideration, the World Court cannot order a remedy.'54
after the trial stage of a case).
149. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ 104, 90 (June 27)
(finding that although the procedural default rule does not in itself violate Article
36 of the Vienna Convention, it may operate in specific cases to violate Article
36(2) by preventing consular assistance from the sending state).
150. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 113 ("[T]he procedural default rule has not
been revised, nor has any provision been made to prevent its application in cases
where it has been the failure of the United States itself to inform that may have
precluded counsel from being in a position to have raised the question of a
violation of the Vienna Convention in the initial trial."); see also Avena
Application, supra note 30, 77 31-42 (citing examples of Mexico's attempts to seek
relief in state and federal courts in the United States).
151. See information supra note 147 and accompanying text (stating Mexico's
allegations of a violation of Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention).
152. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 113 (finding that in only three of the cases had
the proceedings reached a stage where judicial remedies were no longer available).
In the three cases where the "conviction and sentence have become final," the
Court concluded that the United States had in fact violated its duty under Article
36(2) to give full effect to the Vienna Convention. Id.
153. See id. (concluding that not all the cases have "reached a stage at which
there is no further possibility of judicial re-examination of those cases").
154. See Interhandel case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 ICJ 346, at 27 (Mar. 21)
(finding that a State has the right to an opportunity to redress an alleged wrong
within its domestic system before the claimant may take the case to the
international plane); see also Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
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3. The Court Correctly Denied Relief in the Form of Restitutio In
Integrum and Correctly Ordered the United States to Grant
Meaningful Review and Reconsideration
The Avena case presented a unique opportunity for an ICJ decision
to have a practical and immediate impact on the lives of the
defendants.'55 The remedy issued by the ICJ in the case took on new
and resonating importance: 5 6 in the event that the United States
implements the ICJ decision, the defendants could benefit from the
ICJ remedy in a real and tangible way.'57 Using this landmark
opportunity, Mexico argued that the ICJ should grant a remedy
beyond the LaGrand review and reconsideration remedy and provide
the remedy of restitutio in integrum.158 The United States maintained
that the LaGrand remedy of review and reconsideration was
appropriate because there was no major difference between LaGrand
and Avena.159
Ultimately, the difference between the Mexican nationals being
alive or executed is not an easily minimized fact. 160 Because of this
LAW, 472-73 (6th ed. 2003) ("A claim will not be admissible on the international
plane unless the individual alien or corporation concerned has exhausted the legal
remedies available to him in the state which is alleged to be the author of injury.").
155. See information supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text (discussing
the unique opportunity the ICJ decision in Avena represents).
156. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ 104, 128(5), (7)
(June 27) (holding that the ICJ order of provisional measures is binding on the
United States, and the United States must grant review and reconsideration); see
also Too Sovereign, supra note 25, at 2670 (finding that the Avena case will put
the precedential value of LaGrand to test). None of these holdings, however, has
yet been tested in practice before the Avena case. Id.
157. See Betsy Pisik, Review of Death Sentences Ordered; World Court Rules
for 51, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at AO1 (noting the confidence of
the Mexican officials that "the United States will fully comply with the ruling").
158. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 346-47 (distinguishing the
Avena remedy as significantly different from the LaGrand remedy because
Germany did not seek restitutio in integrum given that its nationals were no longer
alive).
159. See Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 124, 8.1 (positing
that Mexico's request for restitutio in integrum is "inappropriate" and has "no
antecedent in international law").
160. See Macina, supra note 88, at 140 (concluding that the Avena case could
have far-reaching effects in U.S.-Mexico relations, including in areas such as trade
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distinction, the ICJ remains competent to issue a judgment directly
applicable to the lives of the defendants. 6' This case also presents an
opportunity, by way of directly affecting the life or death of the
defendants, for the ICJ to provide meaningful review and
reconsideration. 6 2 The ICJ correctly held that restitutio in integrum
is not a viable remedy here because international law does not
support the view that restitutio in integrum is the appropriate remedy
in this situation. 163
a. The ICJ Correctly Denied Mexico Restitutio In Integrum Under
International Law Standards
In international law, "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed." 64 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights defines
restitutio in integrum as including "the restoration of the prior
situation" and "the reparation of the consequences of the
violation.' 1 65 The International Law Commission ("ILC") defines
and immigration).
161. See Liptak, supra note 36 (implying that had the ICJ not issued a ruling
staying the execution of Osbaldo Torres, one of the Mexican defendants in the
Avena case, Mr. Torres would already be dead and the issue would be moot).
162. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128,
131-38 (Mar. 31) (discussing clemency as not constituting meaningful review
and reconsideration); see also Ray, supra note 76, at 1764 (arguing that the United
States has misunderstood the meaning of review and reconsideration, which calls
for retrials or reevaluations of the cases since the violations were discovered).
163. See discussion infra notes 165-180 and accompanying text (discussing
international law and the remedy of restitutio in integrum).
164. See Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G. v. Pol.) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47(Sept. 13) (commenting on the potential injustice of limiting the compensation due
to the German government to "the value of the undertaking at the moment of
dispossession, plus interest to the day of payment"). Such limited restitution would
place Germany in a position less favorable than if Poland had obeyed its
international obligation in the first place. Id.
165. See Veldsquez-Rodriguez (Velsquez-Rodriguez v. Hond.), Inter. Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, 26 (July 21, 1989) (finding that fair compensation to the
family members of a disappeared man included reparation of "material and moral
damages they suffered" and accordingly awarding the family 750,000 lempiras in
compensatory damages), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf ing/
seriec_07_ing.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
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restitution as the primary form of reparation because it requires a
State in violation of a legal principle to "wipe out" the consequences
of the illegal act and to return to the situation that existed before
commission of the violation. 166 Along with the ILC, the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law finds that redress should usually restore the
situation to its state before the violation occurred. 1
67
Guided by these definitions of restitutio in integrum, Mexico
argued for such relief as the appropriate remedy in the Avena case.'
68
In contrast, the United States insisted that the LaGrand decision
ordered review and reconsideration as the available remedy for a
violation of the Vienna Convention, claiming that restitutio in
integrum goes beyond the bounds of an appropriate or possible
remedy. 169
While international law designates restitution as the primary
remedy for a violation of an international legal obligation, 70
international law would not support a holding of restitutio in
166. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-
third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 238-39, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter International Law Commission Report] (discussing the
Factory at Chorz6w case as establishing the primacy of restitution and
acknowledging that certain cases may require restitution as a component of
compliance with a state's obligation to follow peremptory norms of international
law), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2005).
167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 901 cmt. d
(1987) (citing as examples of restitution the restoration of the status quo ante "or
specific performance of an undertaking").
168. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 352-55 (requesting three
specific forms of reparation: (1) vacatur of the sentences and convictions of all the
Mexican nationals party to this case, (2) suppression of evidence obtained in
violation of Article 36 rights, and (3) withholding of the application of municipal
law that prevents the defendants from obtaining relief).
169. See Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 124, 8.1 (arguing
that Mexico asks for a remedy outside the bounds of LaGrand, which would
require reversal of LaGrand and claiming that the remedy of review and
reconsideration "satisfied the purposes of reparations").
170. See International Law Commission Report, supra note 166, at 237 (noting
restitution as the first remedy available when a violation of international law
injures a State and that such restitution usually involves "the re-establishment of
the situation which existed prior to the commission of the internationally wrongful
act").
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integrum as the appropriate remedy in the Avena case.' 7 '
International law places limits on the extent to which full restitution
may be granted. 172 Namely, restitution may take the form of reversing
a juridical act; however, it should not be disproportionate to the
violation of international law at hand.'73 Referring specifically to the
remedy granted in LaGrand, the ILC states, "[r]estitution ... should
not give the injured State more than it would have been entitled to if
the obligation had been performed."' 74 The ILC considers the remedy
of review and reconsideration from LaGrand as proportionate to the
"limited character of the rights in issue."' 7 5
171. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128,
119-121 (Mar. 31) (explaining that the JCJ determines adequate reparation by
examining the circumstances surrounding each case and the "precise nature and
scope of the injury"); see also LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ
104, 125 (June 27) (requiring review and reconsideration of defendant's
conviction and sentence, rather than restitutio in integrum, as the appropriate
remedy when the United States violated its obligation under Article 36).
172. See International Law Commission Report, supra note 166, at 236 (citing
examples of the insufficiency of limited forms of restitution in certain
circumstances, but considering the nature of the obligation breached in order to
determine the appropriate remedy).
173. See id. (responding to concerns that full reparation may have a "crippling"
effect on the State required to provide reparation and applying the principle of
proportionality to each form of reparation). When restitution involves a burden
"out of all proportion to the benefit gained," the situation calls for the exclusion of
such restitution. Id.
174. See id. (explaining that a remedy must remain proportionate to the right and
the violation at hand); see also Daniel Bodansky et al, Righting Wrongs:
Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 833, 838(2002) (stating that the Draft Articles limit the scope of reparations to remedial
measures and curtail full reparation with standards of proportionality).
175. See International Law Commission Report, supra note 166, at 236, n.518
(noting that the Court in LaGrand found that a breach of the notification
requirement established under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
required that reconsideration of the defendant's conviction take into account the
violation of that right). Therefore, the Court applied a remedy proportionate to the
violation of international law. Id. A balancing test must evaluate the rights of the
injured State and the appropriateness of a severe remedy. Id. See also Bodansky et
al, supra note 174, at 849 (discussing the balancing test proposed under the Draft
Articles but finding that "[t]he only instance where the balance seems 'invariably'
to favor restitution is when the failure to provide it would jeopardize the political
independence or economic stability of the injured state").
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Case law from other international courts defines restitutio in
integrum as an appropriate remedy in situations where courts can
grant such a specific remedy. 76 In contrast, the Inter-American Court
granted vacatur, a more limited construction of full restitution, in the
Cantoral Benavides case, where Mr. Cantoral suffered inhumane
treatment while in prison in Peru and continued to suffer psychiatric
and physical problems. 7 7 However, when restoration of the status
quo ante would have an immediate effect, such as through
compensation, then it constitutes an appropriate remedy. 71 Unlike
Cantoral Benavides, restoring the status quo in Avena would bring
about immediate effects; therefore, while restitutio in integrum
certainly remains a viable remedy available at international law,
179
the violation of international law at issue in the Avena case fails to
compel such a remedy.'
176. See Ivcher Bronstein (Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru), Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 84, 21 (Sept. 4, 2001) (restoring Mr. Ivcher's majority shareholder status in a
large company), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf ing/
seriec_84_ing.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
177. See Cantoral Benavides (Cantoral Benavides v. Peru), Inter-Am Ct. H. R.
(ser. C) No. 88, TT 77-78 (Dec. 3, 2001) (holding that violation of the American
Convention and due process demanded the vacation of all judicial or
administrative, criminal or police proceedings), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf ing/seriec_88_ing.pdf (last visited Jan. 29,
2005).
178. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 901 cmt. d
(1987) (finding that when a mob invades an embassy, then the appropriate remedy
would consist of removing the mob, as well as damage compensation, and even
monetary compensation for the injuries suffered by the embassy's staff).
179. See Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 47 (stating the definition of
restitutio in integrum implemented in other international tribunals and discussing
the principles used to determine the compensation due for a violation of
international law).
180. See International Law Commission Report, supra note 166, at 236 (finding
that the restoration of the status quo ante should not give the injured state more
than its entitlement had the offending party performed its obligation). Thus, at the
very least, granting restitutio in integrum would involve restitution
disproportionate to the "limited character of the rights" at stake in this case. Id. See
also Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 124, 8.11-8.12
(discussing the substantial burden of conducting new trials for fifty-two
defendants). The United States makes a compelling argument that in the jury
system, new trials would be expensive, time-consuming and not necessarily
accurate, given the passage of time between the detention of the defendants and the
current situation. Id.
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b. The ICJ Correctly Decided that Clemency Does Not Constitute
Meaningful Review and Reconsideration
In LaGrand, the ICJ gave discretion to the United States to
determine the means for carrying out review and reconsideration.18" '
The ICJ in Avena found that while review and reconsideration
remain an appropriate remedy for a Vienna Convention violation, 182
the United States, in implementing its clemency proceedings, failed
to comply adequately with its duty to review and reconsider Article
36 violations. 183
The United States argued that the clemency process does provide
the meaningful review and reconsideration required by the LaGrand
decision. 184 Moreover, the United States emphasized that it retained
181. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ 104, 125 (June 27)(holding that the United States could choose the means by which it would grant
review and reconsideration); see also Bishop, supra note 4, at 40-41 (providing
meaningful review and reconsideration proves essential to correcting past
violations of the Convention and preventing future violations). While the ICJ
meant for review and reconsideration to prevent future violations of the Vienna
Convention, the United States has not changed its practices with regard to the
Convention. /d.
182. See International Law Commission Report, supra note 166, at 236 (noting
that review and reconsideration constituted an appropriate remedy when it took
into account the violations of international law in LaGrand because it reflected the
limited nature of the Vienna Convention rights).
183. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128,
131 (Mar. 31) (qualifying the phrase "by means of its own choosing" from
LaGrand such that the United States does not have complete and unbridled
discretion to carry out its obligations in any form it wishes); see also Priya Nath,
Note, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United
States) No. 128 (ICJ - Feb. 5, 2003), http://www/ICJ-
cij. org/ICJwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imusorder_20020205.pdf 15 CAP. DEF.
J. 553, 555 (2003) (finding that, in the Avena order for provisional measures, the
United States effectively asserted that it would continue to violate Article 36 injudicial proceedings because it could consider the violations later through the
clemency process).
184. See Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 124, 6.68(asserting that clemency historically acted as a means to ensure fair judicial
proceedings and in the modem era constitutes "part of the constitutional scheme
for ensuring justice and fairness in the legal process"); see also Verbatim Record
of Dec. 16, supra note 128, $T 4.23-4.24 (asserting that Mexico failed to prove that
the United States provides ineffective review and reconsideration through its courts
and clemency process). Specifically in the Avena case, the United States declared
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complete discretion to determine the judicial process used to carry
out review and reconsideration. 85 Mexico countered this argument
by defining clemency as merely an act of executive grace that
executive officers rarely make available as a practical, viable
remedy. 8 6 Mexico criticized the clemency process for operating
without adherence to fixed standards, for the discretionary nature of
its decisions, and for largely unreviewable results'87 and concluded
that clemency failed to satisfy LaGrand's requirement for a judicial
remedy. 188
The United States possessed the discretion to determine the means
for review and reconsideration process,"' yet clemency proceedings,
as an entirely discretionary procedure, cannot replace a judicial
remedy. 90 Clemency generally refers to the executive power to
the review and reconsideration established in LaGrand unnecessary because most
of the cases have not exhausted full judicial proceedings, and clemency remains an
available remedy to those defendants. Id.
185. See Ray, supra note 76, at 1764-65 (arguing the unlikelihood that the ICJ
granted the remedy of review and reconsideration with the understanding that
clemency would satisfy the remedy, and that the United States badly misconstrued
the LaGrand holding).
186. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 250-252 (claiming that not
every defendant can take advantage of the clemency process because political
considerations "rather than the merits of the individual case" influence clemency
outcomes).
187. See Verbatim Record of Dec. 15, supra note 83, 273 (criticizing the
outcomes of the clemency process as arbitrary because "clemency authorities may
by and large follow their own whims and predilections in assessing the merits of a
particular clemency process").
188. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 243-245 (explaining that the
United States could not use executive clemency to fulfill its international
obligation to provide a means for reviewing violations of Article 36). The Court in
LaGrand contemplated the use of judicial procedures to carry out review and
reconsideration. Id.
189. See LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 125 (leaving the choice of means to the
United States for fulfilling the duty of review and reconsideration and
acknowledging that the United States could fulfill its obligation in a number of
ways); see also Ray, supra note 76, at 1761 (discussing the cases of Valdez and
Suarez, where U.S. officials considered granting clemency but the officials
ultimately concluded that the cases did not warrant clemency).
190. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 141-143 ("[T]he premise on which the Court
proceeded in [LaGrand] was that the process of review and reconsideration should
occur within the overall judicial proceedings relating to the individual defendant
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commute or pardon a sentence or conviction. 9' Clemency vests an
enormous amount of discretion in the executive making the decision,
as well as the evidence he or she may consider and the measures
taken. 192 While this discretion may work to the benefit of the
defendant in certain cases, 193 clemency proceedings do not function
as an essential element in determining the guilt or innocence of a
defendant. 194 The ICJ, therefore, correctly found that, at best,
clemency proceedings should only supplement judicial proceedings
of review and reconsideration. 95
c. The ICJ Has Provided for an Appropriate Remedy for a Vienna
Convention Violation
In its Avena decision, the ICJ provided for an appropriate remedy
for when the United States fails to comply with its international legal
duties under the Vienna Convention.'96 The ICJ established that if the
concerned."); see also infra notes 191-194 and accompanying text (concluding that
clemency is an entirely discretionary procedure); Ray, supra note 76, at 1764(stating that the ICJ's remedy of review and reconsideration did not intend for
clemency to constitute permissible judicial review).
191. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1974) (examining the history
and meaning of clemency proceedings and noting executive clemency's roots in
English common law practices); see also Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Position Before
International Court of Justice in Mexican Death Penalty Case, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
434, 436 (2003) (discussing the clemency power as vested either in the president
for federal crimes or in a state governor for state crimes).
192. See Murphy, supra note 191, at 436 (noting the clemency power as a
discretionary power that executive officers-governors of states-sometimes share
with state clemency boards when considering whether to grant clemency to a
defendant who committed a state crime).
193. See id. (citing the Valdez v. Oklahoma example, where the governor
seriously considered any prejudice that may have occurred because of the Vienna
Convention violation, although ultimately concluding that any prejudice was
immaterial to the outcome of the case).
194. See Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 284 (1998)(discussing the clemency process as one that occurs outside of judicial proceedings
without meaning to "enhance the reliability of the trial process").
195. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 143 (finding that clemency proceedings do not
constitute the "review and reconsideration" anticipated in LaGrand, but that the
proceedings may supplement appropriate judicial proceedings).
196. See id. at 121 (defining adequate reparation for an Article 36 violation in
this case as "an obligation on the United States to permit review and
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United States violates Article 36, it should permit review and
reconsideration, ascertaining whether the violation of Article 36
caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the administration of
criminal justice.197 Moreover, the court held that this limitation of
review and reconsideration should take place via a qualified
process. 198 Accordingly, the ICJ called for the United States, in the
case of an Article 36 violation, to "guarantee that the violation and
the possible prejudice caused by that violation will be fully examined
and taken into account in the review and reconsideration process." 199
This review and reconsideration process must also consider both the
sentence and the conviction. 00
The ICJ's ruling is appropriate under international law because it
allows the U.S. courts to determine if review and reconsideration is
necessary and what kind of remedy should apply. 01 Such a remedy is
particularly an appropriate remedy since international law requires
that domestic legal systems have an opportunity to adjudicate a claim
reconsideration of these nationals' cases by the [U.S.] courts"). But see Ray, supra
note 76, at 1764-65 (suggesting the possible remedies that the United States could
have implemented in order to comply with the ICJ's order of "review and
reconsideration" from LaGrand). The author predicts that the United States will
continue its record of poor compliance with international legal obligations. Id.
197. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 121 (applying this remedy to rectify the fact
that the United States committed internationally wrongful acts when it failed to
inform the defendants, notify Mexican consulates, and allow Mexico to provide
consular assistance to the defendants).
198. See id. at 131 (underlining that the phrase "by means of its own choosing"
from LaGrand "is not without qualification" and emphasizing that the United
States must take into account the violations of rights provided by the Convention
when implementing the process of review and reconsideration); see also Ray,
supra note 76, at 1764-65 (defining review and reconsideration as a very specific
process requiring complete examination of the case as well as possible retrials or
exclusion of evidence).
199. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 138 (noting that such measures make the
review and reconsideration process effective).
200. See id. (considering both the conviction and the sentence would compel
U.S. courts to examine the cases very thoroughly); see also Ray, supra note 76, at
1764-65 (predicting that the ICJ would find that the United States misunderstood
the process of review and reconsideration).
201. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128,
122 (Mar. 31) (stating that after review and reconsideration, the U.S. courts
should take account of any possible Vienna Convention violations). In doing so,
the courts should take special note of the underlying prejudice and its origins. Id.
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and provide an available remedy prior to the defendant taking the
claim to the international level.2 °2 As the ICJ observed, most of the
defendants in Avena may not have exhausted their local remedies. As
a result, U.S. courts retain a possibility to review and reconsider their
cases.2 °3 Allowing reconsideration is appropriate given the proportion
of the violations that occurred. °4
4. The Court Should Have Issued an Order of Cessation and Non-
Repetition
The ICJ denied Mexico's request for an order of cessation and a
guarantee of non-repetition on the grounds that Mexico failed to
establish an on-going breach of Article 36.205 Because the Court
found that the fifty-two individual cases "are in the state of pendente
lite,"2 0 6 and because the Court found that the United States has been
making a good faith effort to comply with Article 36,207 it did not
find it necessary to order cessation and an assurance of non-
repetition.2 8
202. See discussion supra note 154 and accompanying text (observing that the
exhaustion rule requires that a claimant exhaust local remedies before raising his
claim on the international level).
203. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J 128, 113 (noting that the criminal proceedings for
most of the defendants still can be "review[ed] and reconsider[ed]" allowing the
United States to fulfill its obligation under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention).
204. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. (describing the limited nature of the
Vienna Convention rights and that international law requires a remedy in
proportion to the rights at issue).
205. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 148-49 (citing the U.S. efforts to notify law
enforcement officers of the duty to inform a foreign national of his right to speak
to a consulate); see also STATE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 30, Part
One (establishing methods by which officials should be informing detained foreign
nationals of their Vienna Convention right to consular notification).
206. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 148 (stating that review and reconsideration is
the appropriate measure).
207. See id. 149 (looking to the literature issued by the State Department to
find that the United States has made a reasonable effort to inform officials of the
Article 36 duties).
208. See id. 150 (relying on LaGrand to conclude that no State could ever
fully comply with an order of cessation or fully guarantee non-repetition).
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Mexico asked the ICJ to order the United States to discontinue its
Article 36 violations with respect to Mexico and Mexican nationals,
and to "provide Mexico with guarantees of non-repetition" of the
Article 36 violations.20 9 While in LaGrand the ICJ found that an
absolute guarantee of cessation and non-repetition would be
logistically impossible,2t ° the ICJ relied on the U.S. argument that it
had implemented an extensive program to comply with its Vienna
Convention obligations. 21' Because it appears that this program has
not progressed extensively since LaGrand,1 2 and because an order of
cessation and non-repetition complies with international law
standards, 13 the ICJ incorrectly denied Mexico's request for an order
of cessation and a guarantee of non-repetition.214
The evidence substantiates Mexico's position that the United
States has not, in fact, improved its approach to implementing the
Vienna Convention since LaGrand.2 5 After the attacks of September
11, 2001, U.S. authorities detained hundreds of foreign nationals
without informing the appropriate consulates.21 6 Despite the ICJ's
209. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, 391 (noting that under
international law orders of cessation and non-repetition are well-established
remedies).
210. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ 104, 124 (June 27)
(stating that no State could ever guarantee non-repetition). In LaGrand, Germany
presented to the ICJ a list of German Nationals who, despite U.S. assurances that
no further Article 36 violations would take place, contended that they had not been
informed of their consular rights. Id.
211. See id. (concluding that when a State "repeatedly refers to substantial
activities" the State is employing to fulfill its obligations, the State sufficiently
expresses its commitment to comply with those obligations).
212. See id. (deciding that because the United States appeared to be
implementing a legitimate program in order to comply with its Vienna Convention
violations, a guarantee of non-repetition would not be appropriate).
213. See discussion infra notes 220-221 and accompanying text (discussing the
viability of orders of cessation and guarantees of non-repetition under international
law).
214. See Bodansky, supra note 174, at 840 (finding that cessation is the primary
obligation a State must fulfill when it has committed an on-going violation of
international law).
215. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing U.S. failure to implement the
Vienna Convention after LaGrand).
216. See Daniel J. Lehman, The Federal Republic of Germany v. the United
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decision in LaGrand that the Vienna Convention confers individual
rights enforceable in courts, state and federal courts have refused to
decide whether Article 36 creates such rights.217 Even when courts
have ruled in favor of defendants who claim that U.S. authorities
violated their Vienna Convention rights, the courts' reasoning does
not rely on the LaGrand decision. I Moreover, state officials have
complied with the ICJ's orders from February of 2003 to stay the
executions of those particular Mexican defendants, but only "out of
courtesy" to the ICJ.2 19
States have an obligation under international law to discontinue
the violation of an international norm, including on-going
violations.22 0 Both cessation of the violation and guarantees of non-
repetition are appropriate remedies under international law.221 In
accord with these international obligations, the ICJ should have held
that because the United States has not implemented an adequate
program to give full effect to the rights under Article 36, the United
States of America: The Individual Right to Consular Access, 20 LAW & INEQ. 313,
316 (2002) (emphasizing the importance of the right to consular access given that
more than seven hundred foreign nationals were detained after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, and that some consulates are unaware of the exact number of
nationals being detained in the United States).
217. See e.g., Bishop, supra note 4, at 42 (discussing that courts are not deciding
whether the Vienna Convention creates individual rights but instead are concluding
that the exclusion of evidence and the dismissal of indictments are not appropriate
remedies for a Vienna Convention violation).
218. See Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703, 709-711 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002)
(granting relief for defendant based on inadequate counsel, but specifically
declining to rely on the ICJ's ruling in LaGrand).
219. See Liptak, supra note 36 (quoting the Oklahoma attorney general, Drew
Edmundson, in his decision to stay the execution of Osbaldo Torres).
220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 901 cmt. c.
(1987) (enumerating the ways a State may be obligated to discontinue a violation).
These obligations include discontinuance, revocation, or cancellation of the act in
question; abstaining from further violations; or performing an obligatory act that
the State failed to perform. Id.
221. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, International Law Commission,
Article 30 (stating that "[t]he State responsible for the internationally wrongful act
is under an obligation: (1) To cease that act, if it is continuing; (2) To offer
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so
require."), available at www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm (last
visited on Jan. 29, 2005).
450 [20:403
2005] A VENA AND OTHER MEXICAN NATIONALS 451
States must cease all violations of the Convention and must
guarantee to Mexico that it will not repeat such violations.2
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION AFTER
BREARD, LA GRAND, AND A VENA
While the United States has submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ
for disputes arising under the Vienna Convention,223 the United
States has not incorporated the ICJ's authority in domestic
procedures and law.2 4 The tension between international law and
222. See LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 124 (noting that a country that "repeatedly
refers to substantial activities which it is carrying out in order to achieve
compliance" with obligations under a treaty, is expressing a commitment to follow
through with its efforts).
223. See Optional Protocol, supra note 45, Article I (providing for compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ for disputes regarding the Vienna Convention); see also
Schiffman, supra note 48, at 52 (discussing the jurisdiction of the ICJ through the
Optional Protocol for the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which establishes
the ICJ as the means by which disputes are settled regarding the Vienna
Convention).
224. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ 104, 33 (June 27)
(quoting the United States Solicitor-General as stating that "an order of the
International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures is not binding and
does not furnish a basis for judicial relief"); see also Avena Application, supra note
30, 34 (arguing that state courts' failure to recognize the Vienna Convention
rights as constitutional rights results in the denial of any meaningful relief for
foreign defendants). Courts are declining to rely on LaGrand for the proposition
that the Vienna Convention creates individual rights, which precludes them from
finding a remedy for an alleged violation. Id. See also United States v. Li, 206 F.3d
56, 60 (2000) (finding a presumption against treaties creating individual rights but
rather the presumption is that treaties create state rights, which provides no redress
for individuals); Schiffman, supra note 48, at 42 (finding that many courts are
going so far as to decline to determine whether the Vienna Convention creates
individually enforceable rights and are instead looking at whether the violation of
the treaty created substantial prejudice to the defendant); Avena Application, supra
note 30, TT 36-42 (proposing that federal courts are essentially misplacing
punishment onto Mexican nationals for the failure on the part of the United States
to inform the Mexican consulate of the detention of its nationals). Because courts
are relying on Breard and not LaGrand, they are finding that the Vienna
Convention does not create individually enforceable rights, much less
constitutional rights, so that the exclusionary rule is not a remedy available to the
defendants. Id. Likewise, actions by the State of Mexico itself in U.S. federal
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domestic law with regard to the Vienna Convention right to consular
notification demands recognition and the Avena decision obviates
resolution of this tension.225
The United States is under a legal obligation both to comply with
its duties under the Vienna Convention and to comply with any ICJ
decision interpreting the Vienna Convention.22 6 As noted above, the
United States has consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ for disputes
arising out of the Vienna Convention. 27 By way of submitting to the
ICJ's jurisdiction, the United States has an obligation to comply with
decisions like LaGrand and Avena that interpreted the Vienna
Convention.228
While the United States continues to violate international law,
there is very little the international community may do in order to
ensure U.S. compliance with its international obligations. 229 The
method by which the United States implements the ICJ rulings is
entirely up to the United States. 3° While no international stronghold
will invade the United States and begin enforcing Vienna
courts have proven unsuccessful. Id. U.S. federal courts have relied on the
Eleventh Amendment to hold that the Convention violations are not of sufficient
ongoing character to defeat sovereign immunity. Id. at 43-47.
225. See discussion infra Part III.B.l.c (concluding that U.S. courts will rely on
Avena as they incorporate international law into their decisions).
226. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (explaining that the Vienna Convention is a
binding treaty for the United States and that an ICJ decision interpreting that treaty
is also binding authority).
227. See discussion supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (looking to the
Vienna Convention and its Optional Protocol as the basis for ICJ jurisdiction over
the United States for Article 36 violations).
228. See Too Sovereign, supra note 25, at 2656-57 (discussing the binding
nature of the Vienna Convention and ICJ decisions interpreting the treaty); see also
LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 42, 45, 48 (holding that the Court has jurisdiction to
hear Germany's submissions); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V.
U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128, 27-35 (Mar. 31) (finding that the Court has jurisdiction to
hear Mexico's claims).
229. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 92 (looking to past decisions regarding Vienna
Convention violations to conclude that U.S. courts are not likely to implement ICJ
decisions).
230. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 120-21 (discussing the holding in LaGrand as
the basis for allowing the United States to choose the means by which it may
determine whether to permit review and reconsideration).
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Convention rights, the methods by which the United States could
choose to enforce Article 36 rights under the Vienna Convention are
multitudinous.231
B. SUGGESTIONS OF METHODS THROUGH WHICH THE UNITED
STATES CAN EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY IMPLEMENT A VENA
AS BINDING AUTHORITY
1. Judicial Implementation
U.S. Supreme Court reliance on Avena as controlling authority is
the most effective way to incorporate the ICJ's ruling from Avena to
U.S. domestic law.232 Most commentators agree that the judicial
system is the best solution for ensuring implementation of Vienna
Convention obligations. 233 This solution remains stifled because
lower courts deny defendants relief in suits regarding the Vienna
Convention, thereby precluding those defendants from ever reaching
the U.S. Supreme Court.234 Thus, the more substantive issue is the
231. See discussion infra III.B (recommending vacatur of the death sentences as
a means of judicial implementation of the Avena remedy in the case of an Article
36 violation as well as considering the ABA Guidelines as a possible option to
implement the ICJ ruling in a meaningful way as it would result in application of
international law at the U.S. domestic court level).
232. See Ray, supra note 76, at 1767-1768 (noting that while the Constitution
makes clear that both statutes and treaties are the supreme law of the land, it is
silent on how to resolve conflicts between them). The Supreme Court's own
precedent demonstrates that it is the province of the judiciary to resolve conflicts
between treaty and statutory obligations. Id.
233. See Lehman, supra note 216, at 339-340 (explaining that the judicial
system provides the best protection for Vienna Convention rights because it is
insulated from political pressures); see also Chad Thornberry, Federalism vs.
Foreign Affairs: How the United States Can Administer Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations Within the States, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 107,
143 (1999) (discussing the benefits of enforcing Article 36 through the courts
versus the law enforcement agencies or state legislatures emphasizing consistency
and technical manageability). But see Wilson, supra note 2, at 1195 (citing the
American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases as a viable solution for Article 36
enforcement because they place the duty on the lawyers to inform their clients of
the right to speak to a consulate of their country of origin).
234. See F.R.G. v. U.S., 526 U.S. 111, 111-112 (1999) (declining to exercise
original jurisdiction over the case). But see Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (issuing a
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question of whether lower courts can directly rely on ICJ decisions
as binding authority absent a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court.235
a. U.S. Courts Should Rely on Avena to Find that There is a
Remedy to the Right Established in LaGrand
Because the United States has consented to the jurisdiction of the
ICJ for "disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention, 236 it has consensually bound itself to the rulings of the
ICJ for disputes over the Convention. 237 Thus, since the ICJ issued a
ruling on the merits of the LaGrand and Avena cases, these decisions
should be controlling in U.S. courts. 238 Despite these obligations,
U.S. courts have declined the opportunity to follow the LaGrand
decision and instead have relied primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court
decision from Breard.2 39
Supreme Court ruling on Breard's and Paraguay's claims).
235. See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the
Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675, 676-677 (2003) (remarking upon
the complexity in the level of deference that federal courts choose to give
international tribunals).
236. See Optional Protocol, supra note 45 (noting that although the United
States has rejected the jurisdiction of the ICJ generally, the ICJ retains jurisdiction
over the United States for Vienna Convention disputes); see also Too Sovereign,
supra note 25, at 2656-2657 (finding that because the United States rejected the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in 1986, the Optional Protocol is important
because the ICJ only has jurisdiction over the United States in cases where a treaty
specifically calls for the Court's jurisdiction, which the Vienna Convention
accomplishes through the Optional Protocol).
237. See Optional Protocol, supra note 45 (providing for compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ over disputes arising out of the interpretation of the Vienna
Convention).
238. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (concluding that U.S. courts are bound by
the ICJ's decisions in disputes arising out of the Vienna Convention).
239. See Too Sovereign, supra note 25, at 2674 (discussing U.S. court decisions
where the courts have relied on Breard and not LaGrand, and contending that in
cases where courts have recognized that the failure to inform a consulate of a
defendant's detention may result in prejudice, which is a recognition based solely
on grounds of inadequate counsel); see also F.R.G. v. U.S., 526 U.S. at 112
(declining to exercise original jurisdiction over Germany's appeal to enforce the
ICJ's order staying the execution of Walter LaGrand). The U.S. Supreme Court has
only issued a ruling on the merits of the Breard case, and not LaGrand, which in
part explains lower courts' reluctance to rely on LaGrand as precedential authority.
Id.
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Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Breard that the Vienna
Convention "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular
assistance following arrest. '240 However, the ICJ unequivocally held
in LaGrand that Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention "creates
individual rights, which . . . may be invoked in this Court by the
national State of the detained person. '241 If U.S. courts were treating
the ICJ decision from LaGrand as binding precedent, then under the
doctrine of stare decisis they could not deny that the Vienna
Convention creates individual rights. 42 By relying on Supreme Court
precedent rather than ICJ precedent, however, U.S. courts have held
that the Vienna Convention does not create individually enforceable
rights.243
240. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (dictum).
241. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ 104, 77 (June 27)
(basing this decision on both its own reading of the text of the provisions of the
Convention as well as previous ICJ jurisprudence).
242. See Amy Coney Barnett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1011, 1012 (2003) (explaining that the doctrine of stare decisis is
traditionally interpreted as binding on judges and not litigants).
243. See Wisconsin v. Navarro, 260 Wis.2d 861, 863-864 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003)
(concluding that the Vienna Convention does not create an individually
enforceable right so that the defendant had no standing to bring his claim); see also
Commonwealth v. Diemer, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 677, 683 (2003) (asserting that
despite the ICJ's opinion in LaGrand, another argument states that international
treaties do not create rights that are privately enforceable in federal courts); State
v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 774, 783 (Iowa 2001) (finding that even if Article 36 creates
individually enforceable rights, those rights do not "rise to the level of a
fundamental right"); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 390 (6th Cir.
2001) ("Absent express language in a treaty providing for particular judicial
remedies, the federal courts will not vindicate private rights unless a treaty creates
fundamental rights on a par with those protected by the Constitution."); United
States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 2001) (relying on the State
Department's view of treaty interpretation such that the Vienna Convention does
not create individual rights and instead creates only state-to-state rights and
obligations). Even before LaGrand, courts relied on Breard to find that the Vienna
Convention did not create individual rights on par with constitutional rights. Id.
See also Shakleford v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E.2d 899 (Va. 2001) (declining to
find that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to consular notification
violated the Vienna Convention or any rights secured under the U.S. Constitution);
Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 (Va. 1998) (looking to the Vienna
Convention's preamble to conclude that the treaty does not create individually
enforceable rights); Li, 206 F.3d at 60-61 (claiming that the Vienna Convention
does not create rights on par with constitutional rights).
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Nonetheless, the courts should rule that the Convention creates
individual rights. 2' There is a chasm between what U.S. courts
consider to be the rule of individual rights under treaties (treaties
generally do not create individually enforceable rights) 245 and what
international courts believe to be the rule of individual rights under
treaties (that treaties do create individual rights).246 One could go so
far as to infer that U.S. courts may never conclude that an ICJ
decision interpreting the Vienna Convention is binding authority 247
given that they have declined to decide the issue of whether the
Vienna Convention creates individual rights, even after LaGrand.248
The Avena decision, however, facilitates U.S. judicial
implementation of Vienna Convention rights because it provides for
a remedy that U.S. courts have already stated is appropriate in the
case of a violation of Article 36.249 U.S. federal courts have used a
"prejudice" standard to conclude, without deciding the individual
rights issue, that a defendant must show prejudice resulting from the
denial of his Vienna Convention rights in order to receive a
remedy.250  By implementing the Avena remedy, courts will
effectively acknowledge an individual right to consular access under
244. See Madej v. Schomig, 2002 WL 31386480, at 1 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("After
LaGrand... no court can credibly hold that the Vienna Convention does not
create individually enforceable fights. The International Court of Justice was quite
clear on that point").
245. See Iraola, supra note 27, at 191 (discussing the holding in Breard v.
Greene that treaties do not create individual fights).
246. See LaGrand, 2001 ICJ 104, 42 (stating implicitly that treaties create
individual rights).
247. See Schomig, 2002 WL 31386480 at 1 (alleging that for the countries that
adopted the Optional Protocol, like the United States, the ICJ decision regarding
the Vienna Convention is binding and that "[t]o disregard one of the ICJ's most
significant decisions interpreting the Vienna Convention would be a decidedly
imprudent course").
248. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing U.S. courts willful disregard of
the LaGrand decision); see also discussion supra note 243 (noting cases that have
declined to rely on LaGrand or to decide whether the Vienna Convention creates
individual rights).
249. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.c (conveying that the remedy provided for
in the Avena decision is appropriate in light of the violations that have occurred).
250. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 53-55 (observing several U.S. federal court
cases that invoked the prejudice standard).
456 [20:403
A VENA AND OTHER MEXICAN NATIONALS
the Vienna Convention. 1 Creating an individual right to consular
access is not inconsistent with the Constitution.252 Providing for an
individual right in U.S. courts would establish a right on par with a
federal or statutory right.2 13 If U.S. courts apply the remedy
established in Avena, they would comply both with the Avena
decision and with the LaGrand decision.
254
b. U.S. Courts Should Implement the Avena Decision by Granting
Meaningful Review and Reconsideration Through Vacating
the Death Penalties
In the case where a court determines that there has been an Article
36 violation that resulted in actual prejudice, the ICJ stated in Avena
that "review and reconsideration should be both of the sentence and
conviction. 255 Review and reconsideration in the form of vacating
251. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128,
139 (Mar. 31) (noting that
[t]he rights guaranteed under the Vienna Convention are treaty rights which
the United States has undertaken to comply with in relation to the individual
concerned, irrespective of the due process rights under United States
constitutional law ... what is crucial in the review and reconsideration
process is the existence of a procedure which guarantees that full weight is
given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention,
whatever may be the actual outcome of such review and reconsideration.).
252. See Lehman, supra note 216, at 328-331 (arguing that the LaGrand
decision and U.S. law are not mutually exclusive because Congressional intent
would be in favor of protecting Americans abroad and thereby in favor of the
Vienna Convention's rights); see also Schiffman, supra note 48, at 60 (noting that
"respectful consideration of international law is wholly consistent with the U.S.
Constitution and the Federalist tradition").
253. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (explaining that treaties are on the same
hierarchical plane as federal statutes); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. §2255 (2003)
(establishing a prisoner's right to move for vacatur or correction of a sentence
when the sentence was imposed in violation of the U.S. Constitution).
254. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 120-121 (expounding upon the remedy in
LaGrand to create the remedy of review and reconsideration that takes into
account any prejudice that may have occurred to the defendant during the criminal
proceedings).
255. Id., 138; see also Nath, supra note 183, at 555 (discussing the
ineffectiveness of clemency proceedings because they essentially allow the United
States to continue to violate Article 36 obligations). In Avena, the ICJ refined the
U.S. obligation to grant "review and reconsideration" under LaGrand. Id. See also
discussion supra Part II.A.3.a. (concluding that restitutio in integrum is not an
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the death sentences is the remedy that concretely reconciles the
obligation of review and reconsideration from LaGrand with the
more refined remedy presented in Avena.256 The invocation of the
death penalty is both a violation of one's individual rights under the
Vienna Convention and is a violation of international due process
rights.2 57 If U.S. courts vacated the death sentences, that decision
would comply more directly with international law in this area given
that international law generally disfavors the use of the death
penalty. 8
Calling for vacatur of the death sentences would further allow U.S.
domestic courts to reassess the appropriateness of the death penalty
without needing to negotiate new trials, evidence, or the guilt of the
defendants .2 9 Furthermore, vacating the death sentences would
appropriate remedy for Mexico in this case). The ICJ interpreted LaGrand to find a
middle ground between Mexico's all-inclusive plea for restitutio in integrum and
the U.S. under-inclusive use of clemency as appropriate review and
reconsideration. Id. See also LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. United States) 2001 ICJ
104, 125 (June 27) (holding that the United States must grant review and
reconsideration in the case of a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention).
Clemency may be an appropriate application of review and reconsideration when
retroactively considering a case conceming defendants who are already dead, but
clemency does not provide meaningful review and reconsideration for defendants
who are still alive. Id. See also Memorial of Mexico, supra note 83, at 242-44(arguing that clemency is an ineffective remedy and that despite the fact that the
United States has discretion to give effect to Article 36, it may not choose an
ineffective remedy).
256. See Avena, 2004 ICJ 128, 121 (asserting that the appropriate remedy for
an Article 36 violation is review and reconsideration with an eye to whether the
violation "caused actual prejudice to the defendant"); see also LaGrand, 2001 ICJ
104, 125 (noting that legitimate review and reconsideration must take "account
of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention"). Although "the choice of
means must be left to the United States," the choice of means should provide
actual and meaningful review, not a promise of review. Id. See also Nath, supra
note 183, at 555 (implying that clemency proceedings are a meaningless
procedure). Clemency proceedings are, essentially, only a promise of review. Id.
257. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion OC-16/99
137 (October 1, 1999) (stating that failure to recognize the rights under Article
36(l)(b) of the Vienna Convention "is prejudicial to the guarantees of the due
process of law; in such circumstances, imposition of the death penalty is a
violation of the right not to be 'arbitrarily' deprived of one's life").
258. See Wilson, supra note 2, at 1198 (suggesting that the overall trend in
international law is toward the abolition of the death penalty).
259. See Liptak, supra note 36 (quoting the Mexican foreign affairs minister as
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require only a re-sentencing hearing, which reduces the burden on
U.S. courts and does not require them to conduct new trials for each
defendant. 60 In some cases, U.S. courts may find that the right to
speak to a consulate would have made a significant difference in the
case and therefore would merit further reconsideration or even a
retrial.161 Judges would have the discretion to impose life sentences,
however, if a particularly egregious case required it.
262
Such a result would not be disproportionate to the "limited
character of the rights in issue,' 2 63 but would address the fact that the
Mexican nationals are still alive and therefore merit some form of
practical relief.26 An appropriate and meaningful interpretation of
review and reconsideration, with an eye to determine whether actual
prejudice occurred, would compel U.S. courts to grant vacatur of the
sentences to the death penalty.265
saying that life sentences are more likely to result when a defendant is allowed to
exercise his rights to consular protection). See generally Avena Application, supra
note 30, 69-267 (establishing the individual facts of each of the fifty-two
defendants on death row). Mexico does not argue the guilt or innocence of its
nationals on death row, but rather that a different outcome would result if the
defendants were allowed to speak to their consulate. Id.
260. See Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 124, 8.11-8.14
(discussing the heavy burden of conducting new trials for each defendant); see also
International Law Commission Report, supra note 166, at 237 (finding that the
form of reparation should not be disproportionate to the issue at hand).
261. See e.g., Memorial of Paraguay, supra note 33, 2.3-2.12 (noting the
differences between the Paraguayan criminal justice system and the American
criminal justice system, adding that Mr. Breard's ignorance of these differences
made a significant difference in his legal strategy).
262. See Stephanos Bibos, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in
a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L. J. 1097, 1125-27 (2001) (concluding that at
common law, judges had wide discretion to grant sentences for misdemeanors and
therefore sentencing was not solely within the province of the jury); see also
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 37 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (finding
that judges may reduce a jury-determined sentence in a second trial to that of the
first trial, if greater, when in the interest of avoiding vindictiveness).
263. International Law Commission Report, supra note 166, at 236, n.518.
264. See discussion supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text (observing the
novelty of the Avena decision given that the defendants are still alive).
265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §901 cmt. d
(1987) (asserting that international tribunals have wide latitude to determine a
remedy and may choose a remedy deviating from the norm, so long as the parties
have presented that remedy in their pleadings).
45920051
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
c. Violations Are Likely to Cease as U.S. Jurisprudence Relies
More Heavily on International Law
The United States has already interpreted international law as
binding on domestic courts.266 For example, as early as 1900 the U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged that "international law is part of our
law. 2 67 The president also has the authority to make a binding
agreement with a foreign state even when the agreement requires a
change in state law.2 68 The United States cannot avoid its
international obligations by asserting its domestic law because
international law can require domestic law to change.269
As U.S. courts look more frequently upon decisions from
international jurisdictions when making their decisions,270 it becomes
more likely that the judicial system will respond to the need to
enforce ICJ decisions in the courts.271 Logically, the courts' adoption
of international norms is the most critical factor towards U.S.
266. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (discussing the
historical role of international law in the United States); see also Pink, 315 U.S. at
230 (asserting that a federal executive agreement with a foreign government
trumped state law). This case shows that historically, international agreements
have been controlling law in the United States. Id.
267. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
268. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 230 (finding that the President had the authority to
make an agreement with the Soviet government where the agreement trumped
local New York state law).
269. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (prohibiting a party from invoking its domestic law "as
justification for failure to perform a treaty"); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (holding that the state of Missouri was bound to a treaty that
prohibited the killing, capturing, or selling of certain migratory birds despite
possible infringement on states' rights under the Tenth Amendment); William J.
Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs
and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 292-93 (1998) (noting that the
United States has a duty to fulfill its international legal obligations in addition to
domestic legal obligations).
270. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (relying on the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination as a basis for finding that discrimination is
impermissible).
271. See discussion supra notes 232-235 and accompanying text (discussing the
idea that the judicial system provides the best forum for implementing ICJ
decisions as binding authority).
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adoption of ICJ rulings and fulfillment of Vienna Convention
obligations.272
Evidence supports the suggestion that federal courts implement
international law in their decisions." 3 The U.S. Supreme Court has
also shown a willingness to look at international law in some of its
more recent opinions.274 Justices Stevens and Breyer have further
expressed an interest in complying with an ICJ decision in the Avena
case. 215 Some lower courts held that the Vienna Convention is
enforceable, even without controlling Supreme Court case law to
guide the lower courts' holdings. 76 Thus, hope exists that U.S. courts
will independently incorporate the ICJ decisions into their rulings.277
2. Non-Judicial Implementation of Avena to Ensure the United
States' Cessation ofArticle 36 Violations
a. ABA Guidelines are a Workable Enforcement Mechanism for
the Vienna Convention Rights
One particularly compelling idea to ensure cessation of Article 36
violations has arisen through the ABA's adaptation of revised
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
272. See Ray, supra note 76, at 1767 (concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court
must implement the ICJ ruling in order for it to be effective). But see discussion
supra Part III.B.2.a (arguing that the ABA Guidelines may serve as a means of
implementing the rights under the Vienna Convention without contradicting or
relying on Supreme Court precedent).
273. See Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the International Court of
Justice, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 787, 791-93 (1998) (citing the number of
domestic cases that have pointed to international law).
274. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2347.
275. See Torres v. Mullin, 2003 WL 22697573 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(finding the LaGrand decision as authoritative precedent necessitating
consideration); see also Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1035 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Depending on how the ICJ decides Mexico's related case against the
United States, and subject to further briefing in light of that decision, I may well
vote to grant certiorari in this case.").
276. See discussion infra note 283 (noting that two lower court decisions that
have relied on ICJ decisions).
277. See discussion supra notes 270-276 and accompanying text (arguing that
domestic court decisions should incorporate international law).
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Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.278 Importantly, these Guidelines are
important because they refer specifically to the obligation to apply
international law on the domestic court level in the United States.279
The Guidelines require counsel "at every stage of the case [to] make
appropriate efforts to determine whether any foreign country might
consider the client to be one of its nationals;" defense counsel would
also have an affirmative duty to inform his or her client immediately
of the right to speak to the appropriate consulate and to gain the
client's consent to speak to the consulate.28 °
Placing the burden on defense counsel to inform the client of his
right to speak to the relevant consulate would relieve many of the
problems that domestic courts have with enforcement of international
norms. 8 1 It would also relieve problems of timing because once the
defendant receives counsel, under the ABA Guidelines, he also
would have information about his right to consular notification.282
Furthermore, this approach would convert a violation of Article 36
into an issue of adequate counsel, and courts have been positively
inclined to consider Article 36 violations in this context. 83 The
placement of the duty to inform a defendant of his consular access
278. See ABA Guidelines, supra note 24, at 10.6 (noting that the Guidelines
drew applicable standards from the Vienna Convention because it was a related
source).
279. See Wilson, supra note 2, at 1195 (remarking that the ABA Guidelines are
the first set of standards to refer to the obligation to apply international law in
domestic courts).
280. See ABA Guidelines, supra note 24 (finding substantial evidence showing
that American authorities are apt to fail to comply with the obligations under the
Vienna Convention and explaining that failure to comply has both practical and
legal consequences). If counsel receives consent to speak to the consulate, counsel
must act on that consent immediately and contact the consulate. Id.
281. See Wilson, supra note 2, at 1198 (observing that domestic courts do not
provide effective protection of the rights under the Vienna Convention because to
do so would require providing an effective remedy).
282. See id. at 1197-98 (stating that with the burden placed on counsel to raise
the Vienna Convention claim, the issue of "without delay" would be resolved).
283. See Valdez, 46 P.3d at 710 (granting Valdez relief on the basis of
inadequate counsel where he alleged a violation of his Vienna Convention rights);
see also Schomig, 2002 WL 31386480 (noting in dicta that the defendant's case
was never about the Vienna Convention but was rather primarily about the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
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rights on counsel would also allow the defendant to bring a claim of
inadequate counsel at later stages of judicial proceedings and he
would not be barred from bringing a claim because of the procedural
default rule.284
CONCLUSION
This case note has observed that ICJ decisions are binding
authority in the United States when they interpret conflicts arising
out of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 85 The United
States has recognized the importance of the Vienna Convention2 86
and it cannot circumvent its obligation to implement this treaty.2 87
With the ruling of the Avena case, the United States gains ever more
responsibility to fulfill its obligations under the Vienna
Convention. 88
The United States must carefully consider its role in the
international legal system and how it will effectively and
successfully implement international law on the domestic plane.28 9 If
the United States wishes to participate in and benefit from
international law, then it must be willing to recognize this body of
law as cogent, binding authority.2 90 An excellent beginning would be
284. See analysis supra note 97 (discussing how the function of the procedural
default rule prevents defendants from raising claims under the Vienna
Convention).
285. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (elucidating that the Optional Protocol
provides for the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ for disputes arising out of
interpretation of the Vienna Convention).
286. See discussion supra note 34 (remarking that in the Tehran case, the United
States argued from the Vienna Convention to secure the release of the U.S.
hostages).
287. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (explaining the jurisdiction of the ICJ over
the United States for disputes regarding the Vienna Convention).
288. See discussion supra Part III (advocating that the United States view the
ICJ ruling in Avena as binding authority and implement it as such).
289. See discussion supra Part III.B (proposing methods by which the United
States can implement the Avena decision both judicially and non-judicially).
290. See discussion supra Parts II-II (suggesting that the United States should
rely more heavily on international law).
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to acknowledge the gravity of the Avena decision and implement the
ruling in domestic courts.2 91
291. See discussion supra Part III (recommending that the United States
implement the ICJ decision in Avena as binding precedent).
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